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This article presents a contextual analysis of the in-
ternational diplomatic process, the initial part of a policy-
oriented study of international diplomacy.1 The central con-
cern of this writing is authoritative decisions, both in the
past and in the future, and the policies that should guide
this process in attaining a preferred world public order. To
appreciate the policy issues underlying decisions,
however, one must understand the contexts in which the de-
cisions are made. To clarify how diplomatic decisions are
made, this article will analyse the participants in the diplo-
matic process, the perspectives that they have, the arenas in
which the process occurs, the base values and strategies em-
ployed by the actors, together with the outcomes and effects
of the process.
In scholarly literature, the word "diplomacy" is used
to mean the management of International relations either by
negotiation2 or by the entire process of making and executing
foreign policy.3 But the term "diplomatic process," as used
in this article, is not as narrow as the first definition,
nor as wide as the second. It is used here to mean the
process of transnational communication among the elites of the
world. The communication is mostly interpersonal; but it also
occurs through the written word, through telecommunication de-
vices, or even through acts that are intended to communicate
*This article is excerpted from a book on Diplomacy and
World Public Order which the author has in progress. The text
on "participants" and the footnotes are abridged. Copyright
is retained by the author.
**J.S.D. (Yale); Professor of Law & Head of the Depart-
ment of Law, Andhra University, India; Senior Fellow, Yale
Law School 1976-77. The author is grateful to Professors
Myres S. McDougal and W. M. Reisman for their comments and
suggestions. He is indebted to the University Consortium for
World Order Studies, New York, for a supporting grant.
1. There have been a number of studies in internation-
al law applying this discipline. See e.g., McDoual, Lasswell,
& Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Outer Space 1963).
2. Ea., see H. Nicolson, Diplomacy 13 (1950).
3. S. Kertesz & H. Fitzsimons, eds., Diplomacy in a
Changing World 266n (1959).
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a message.
The importance of the study of diplomacy hardly re-
quires a special explanation. Inter-elite communication is
an essential precondition for the ongoing social process in
the global community--a process by which people, acting as
organized groups rather than as individuals and using the base,
values at their disposal, pursue all human values. Communica-
tion is necessary for each elite to know the perspectives (de-
mands, identifications, and expectations) of others in order
to have value exchanges, to establish civic (or private) or-
ders, and to make collaborative arrangements for shaping and
sharing of values. Communication is inherent, as will be
seen below, in all phases of public order decisions. A bet-
ter world public order can be visualized as one which, among
other things, provides a more effective inter-elite communi-
cation system.
In the study of diplomacy, lawyers have usually devoted
their attention to the privileges and immunities of diplomatic
personnel, which indeed facilitate the diplomatic process.
Professional diplomats, on the other hand, have concentrated
on the practices used in sending and receiving diplomatic per-
sonnel and in negotiating agreements. Recently, analytic
skills have been employed to study the techniques and behav-
ior of negotiators in the field of int rnational relations, as
well as in labor-management relations.3 Mathematical skills
have also been used to develop what is known as "game theory"
to provide an a priori analytic tool to understand the behavior
of actors in situations of interaction.5 These different
scholarly contributions, though they are selective in scope and
perspective, furnish a better means for gaining a comprehensive
and meaningful view of the diplomatic process and for studying
the policy issues presented to decision-makers.
It is necessary to define the terms which will be used
in describing the diplomatic process before analyzing it con-
textually.
A. The World Social Process
The social process has already been referred to as the
4. Some important contributions in this regard are:
Thomas C. Schellina, The Strategy of Conflict (1960); Fred
Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (1964); Elmore Jackson, Meeting of
Minds (_952); Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargain-
ing (1963). Some others are referred to below.
5. Of the extensive literature on this subject, mention
may be made of J. Neumann & 0. Morgenstern, The Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior (1944); R. Luce & H. Raiffa, Games and De-
cisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (1957).
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pursuit of all human values. On the world scene, the most im-
portant actors involved in this pursuit are the territorially
based human groups called nation-states, but social interac-
tions are not limited to them. There are transnational govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations as well as individ-
uals devoted to the pursuit of values. One may categorize
values In several different ways; however, the following eight
categories are used in this study: (1) "power," which is the
ability to influence the behavior of others, arising from for-
mal authority or non-formal factors, or a combination of both;
(2) "wealth," which consists of goods and services having eco-
nomic significance; (3) 'Well-being," defined as the health and
safety of the physical organism; (4) "affection," which is the
enjoyment of highly congenial Interpersonal relations; (5) "en-
lightenment," which is the knowledge of contemporary and his-
torical events; (6) "skill," defined as proficiency in arts or
crafts; (7) "respect," which Is the value of honor and the ac-
cess to other values without discrimination; and finally
(8) "rectitude," which is a moral value, such as virtue.6
Participants in the social process employ the base val-
ues at their disposal In pursuit of goal or "scope" values, mak-
ing use of available "institutions" in accordance with their
plans or programs. An "institution" Is a practice specialized
to the pursuit of a particular value or set of values. A plan
of management of the available base values and access to in-
stitutions for the achievement of goals is referred to as
"strategy." An "outcome" of an Interaction is the gain or loss
of values to the interactors. This immediate consequence to
the parties affects the overall pattern of values in the com-
munity, and the resulting change is referred to as an "effect."
As processes of interaction become stabilized Into prac-
tices, the patterns of distribution of values among the members
of the community also become stabilized, and remain stable over
a period of time. Necessarily, some members of the community
will possess a larger share of one or more values than others.
The expression "elite" may be used to indicate those who pos-
sess a greater share of values than others. "Mass" or "rank
and file" refers to the rest.
The Public Order System
Part of the overall social process is the pursuit of pow-
er. In any community It is expected that some participants
will exercise the power at their disposal and make "decisions"
6. These categories and several other concepts used be-
low are taken from the writings of Myres S. McDougal and Harold
D. Lasswell.
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(i.e., or choices among the available alternatives) In the
name of the whole community, and enforce them, if necessary,
by applying sanctions. These decisions can be divided into
those based upon authority and those based upon naked power.
"Authority" refers to the structure of expectations regarding
those who possess the necessary qualifications and competence
to make decisions and the procedures that are adopted to make
and implement the decisions. A participant is referred to as
having "control" over a decision when he has an effective
voice In its making.
Decisions based upon authority and effective control
protect some of the features of the social process, including
the social goals and implementing institutions. The process
of authoritative decision, which is only part of the social
process, also receives protection. All features of the so-
cial process which receive stable and sustained protection may
be referred to as "public order." Public order decisions, on
the one hand, establish, maintain, expand, alter, or even radi-
cally transform, the processes by which these decisions are
made and Implemented; on the other hand, they may affect the
distribution of values among the claimants. In fact, the same
decision may affect the constitutive process of authoritative
decisions and the distribution of values, although in any event,
one set of consequences may be more prominent than others.
An authoritative decision has seven functional phases:
"prescription" is a phase which consists of expressions and
communicates in verbal terms the patterns of permitted or pro-
hibited behavior. Prior to prescription are the phases of
"Intelligence" and "promotion" (or "recommendation"). "In-
telligence" consists of gathering relevant information about
past events, studying future trends, and formulating and eval-
uating the various alternatives available to attain the pre-
ferred goals. "Promotion" is urging the acceptance of specific
proposals that are put forward. Subsequent to prescription are
the phases of "invocation," "application," "appraisal," and
"termination." "Invocation" is the preliminary characteriza-
tion of the particular factual situation as failing within the
scope of the prescription. 'Application" Is the final charac-
terization of the situation and the execution of the prescrip-
tion. "Appraisal"is the evaluation of'the prescription in the
light of the goals and results actually produced. $'Termination"
is the ending of either the prescription or some arrangement
within the prescription.7
7. For more elaborate description of these phases, see
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process
of Authoritative Decision," 19 Journ. of Legal Edn. 253, 415-
437 (1967).
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B. The Inter-Elite Communication System
The inter-elite communication network in the modern
world is highly complex. Each established or aspiring elite
group within a nation maintains communication with elite
groups outside its national boundaries. The groups Include,
in addition to the established and aspiring elites of other
nation-states, International officials and leaders of non-
official international organizations.
Organizationally and functionally, inter-elite com-
munication is more complex than the communication exchange be-
tween individuals or small groups who represent larger ones.
Careful observation will show that communication can be di-
vided into five phases: intelligence, correlation (analysis
and planning), transmitsion of guidance, communication ex-
change, and feed-back.0 Information is gathered and subjected
to a selective and interpretive process. The intelligence
operation in this context is similar to what takes place in
connection with public order decisions. The gathering of in-
telligence is done by both official and non-official agencies,
including those of public Information. The intelligence ac-
quired is then further analysed and interpreted In relation to
the general situation. Alternative plans are prepared to meet
the situation, choices are made, and guidance is transmitted
to those engaged in communication exchange. The response of
the elites forms feed-back, which is then treated in the same
way as intelligence.
C. Communication and Bargaining
Inter-elite communication occurs more often in a frame-
work of strategic bargaining than In simple bargaining; nei-
ther party is explicit in what it offers and expects in re-
turn.9 The excellence of a bargaining strategy will be ap-
praised by the surplus of values or advantages it brings. In
other words, if information is sought, more Information must
be obtained from the other party than Is given to it. If it
is a collaborative arrangement, it should entail a lesser
share of the investment and a better share of the returns.
When the objective is promotion of a particular public order,
the new public order should further the values preferred by
8. See Lasswell, "Attention Structure and Social
Structure,"L. Bryson, ed., The Communication of Ideas 243
(1948).
9. On the distinction between "simple" and "strategic"
bargaining, see 0. R. Young, The Politics of Force 36 (1968).
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one's own side to a greater degree than the values sought by
the other side.
The success of a diplomatic strategy, however, is de-
pendent to a large extent upon the choices made by the other
party. He may refuse to collaborate, or even to communicate
or disclose any information. Bargaining situations may even
be defined as situations in which the ability of a partici-
pant to gain his ends depends on the choices and decisions
that another participant will make; each is aware that his
own actions are being interpreted and anticipated by the other,
and consequently each acts with due attention to the expecta-
tions that he creates.l0 Inter-elite communication proceeds
precisely within this framework. Each participant shapes what
he communicates with a view towards influencing the other, to
settle for something approximating the other's minimum, or
even less than the minimum, and for something nearing or sur-
passing his own maximum. The techniques and tactics adopted
are designed towards attaining this objective. As a result,
communication is rarely straightforward, outspoken, or fully
informative.
The strategic game of diplomacy, however, does not al-
ways proceed, nor should it proceed, as a purely competitive,
or zero-sum game. Indeed, the strategic game in general Is
never purely competitive, except when the parties engage In a
war to the finish; it Is partly collaborative and partly com-
petitive. 11 Since the values available to the parties are
varied, and since the individual utilities of the nation dif-
fer, it is always possible to discover by diplomacy several
mutually beneficial solutions to a conflict situation. Thus,
the game can be a variable-sum one with a number of alterna-
tive solutions.
D. The Game and Bargaining Theories
Game theory is based upon the concept of "pay-off."
This is the value accretion or loss, expressed in numerical
terms, which a participant is supposed either to obtain or to
suffer from a given interaction. Each participant is assumed
to have more than one way of playing a game. For instance, if
there are two players and each has two alternative moves, the
resulting pay-offs of the four possible outcomes can be ar-
ranged in a mathematical matrix. The pay-offs vary as the
game is a zero-, fixed- or variable-sum game. The matrix be-
10. T. C. Schelling, supra note 4, at 5, 21.
11. Schelling, supra note 4, at 5, 83; Young, supra
note 9, at 36.
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comes increasingly complex as the number of actors and the
moves available to them increase.
Game theory is a useful tool for analysing and under-
standing situations of interaction, but its predictive value
has several limitations. First, each actor in the world arena
is aware of the way in which other participants, or at least
those with whom the actor foresees the possibility of interac-
tion, will interpret his moves. Such interpretations, more-
over, are likely to vary. As a result, the game is to be con-
ceived as having a large number of participants playing in
different styles in which case it becomes extremely complex
and difficult to use for predictive purposes. On the other
hand, if it is assumed that only two players are involved, the
game may be too simple, which makes a prediction unreliable.
Second, since there are many values sought by participants, as
well as many means for attaining them, the available moves
will render the game too complex.12 Third, since the actors
live in situations affected by varied experiences and emotions,
they are not likely to act strictly in accordance with reason,
which is assumed for the purpose of the game theory.13  Ir-
rationality is as likely to be present in human actions as not.
At any rate, that is the ordinary human expectation.]4
The theories about strategic bargaining also have their
own limitations as tools for predicting outcomes. In develop-
ing these theologies, scholars have applied analytic techniques
and used empirical findings obtained from both simulated games
and true case studies. The contributions help explain the in-
fluence of culture and tradition on a negotiator's behavior.
They also suggest how the behavior of one party, such as that
of a "reformed sinner" (one who is unaccommodating at the be-
ginning, fully conciliatory later, and who then makes coopera-
12. The complexity further increases due to the dy-
namic character of the games, since in social and political
contexts no game is exactly replayed, and each game leads to
a new game. On the recursive game-models, see M. A. Kaplan'
System and Process in International Politics 205 1957).
13. See the remarks of K. E. Boulding, Conflict and De-
fense 57 (1972T.
14. See ej., the reply of Stalin, at the Tehran con-
ference, to the query of Churchill, whether Turkey would not be
mad if she refused to join the war on the invitation of Russia,
losing thereby the sympathy of both the United States and Great
Britain, that a number of people preferred to be mad. Winston
Churchill, The Hinge of Fate 305 (the 4th of 6 volumes on the
Second World War pub. by Bantam Books, New York, 1948) (Here-
inafter each volume is cited by its title).
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tion conditional) or "lapsed saint" (conciliatory first and
conditionally cooperative later) affects the response of the
other party.i1
Despite the valuable insight gained Into negotiating
behavior, there is a long way to go before there is a reli-
able theory for predicting the bargaining behavior of a par-
ticipant. The reasons are, first, that If one party acts in
the expectation that the other party will act in a particular
way, the other party, who, by the definition of bargaining, Is
necessarily aware of this expectation, may choose deliberately
to act contrary to the expectation.16 Second, the bargaining
theories also proceed on the assumption of rational human
choices,17 an assumption which is not wholly true.
E. Diplomatic Strategy, Persuasive or Coercive?
Strategies, broadly speaking, are either persuasive or
coercive. Persuasion can be described as the outcome of an
interaction where one party has a free choice among several
alternatives for obtaining his preferred values, and he
chooses in accordance with the wishes of the strategist. The
former is said to be persuaded by the latter. On the other
hand, coetcion is an outcome which requires subjection of one
party to.a high degree of constraint to cause him to choose
according to the strategist's desires. This may be done 6y
drastically reducing the range of alternatives with threats of
deprivations or promises of high rewards or by making some al-
ternatives impossible or only notionally possible.18
Strategies can be classified Into four categories:
"diplomatic," "ideological," "economic," and '"litary."
15. See T. Harford & L. Solomon, "'Reformed Sinner'
and 'Lapsed Saint' Strategies In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,"
11 J. of Conf. Res. 104 (1967). A "prisoner's dilemma" situ-
ation is one in which an actor interacts simultaneously and
separately with two others, under the conditions that (a)
there is no communication between the two others, (b) if both
yield or withhold, both suffer, and (c) if only one yields, he
gains and the other suffers.
16. See 0. J. Bartos, "How Predictable are Negotia-
tions?" 11 J. f Conf. Res. 485 (1967).
17. Schelling makes this assumption explicit.
Schellin supra note 4, at 3.
T8. For a definition of "coercion," see M. S. McDougal
and Associates, Studies In World Public Order 29WnV7960
C. M. Case, Non-Violent Coercion (1923); F. E. Lumely, Means
of Social Control (1925).
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While the diplomatic strategy consists primarily of communi-
cation among the elites, the ideological strategy comprises
communication between the elites and the masses. The eco-
nomic strategy involves furnishing or withholding goods and
services, and the military strategy concerns the use of in-
struments of violence. Only on rare occasions is any one of
these instruments used exclusively; often two or more are em-
ployed in various combinations and intensity.
The military strategy is definitely coercive, and the
economic strategy may produce coercive effects if the threat-
ened deprivations drastically reduce the freedom of choice
among the available alternatives. The ideological strategy
is also coercive In some situations. 19
When a person who is required to choose from among a
set of alternatives, he will select the one that most accords
with his perspectives. In a diplomatic strategy, therefore, a
communicator endeavors to influence that choice, first by show-
ing how the alternative identifications are more worthy of
adoption. Secondly, the communicator tries to change the ex-
pectations of the communicatee by indicating that his current
expectations are unrealistic with reference to the environ-
ment. Finally, the communicator shapes his messages to show
that the demands of the communicatee are either unrealistic or
unprofitable, and to influence him to adopt new demands which
can be easily satisfied. By thus changing the perspectives of
the communicatee,20 the communicator seeks to influence his
choice. But If the communicatee has access to other sources
of information and his freedom of choice is not affected, the
process has to be regarded as persuasive.
On the other hand, if the communicator curtails the
freedom of the communicatee and his access to other sources of
Information, the process becomes coercive. The communicator
may transmit credible threats of sense deprivations, or prom-
Ises of high rewards and manipulate the flow of communication
to the communicatee.11 The impact of such operations on the
communicatee depends upon the apparent objective of the com-
municator, the power potentials and capabilities of both par-
ties, the situation in which they are placed, and the tech-
19. B. S. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order 28(1968),.
20. On "persuasive communication," see C. I. Hovland,
I. L. Janis & K. H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion 10(1953); Stevens, supra note 4, at 57.
21. On the coercive character of the diplomatic
process, see Young, supra note 9, at 37; Youn ., The Intermed-
iaries 39 (967; Stevens, supra note 4, at 5
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niques and tactics of communication adopted. To distinguish
a persuasive from a coercive strategy and to assess the level
of coercion, it is necessary, therefore, to refer to the
factual context in which the strategy is applied.
II. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
A. Participants
Participants in the diplomatic process may be described
in terms of groups or sub-groups on behalf of whom the elites
communicate. Two or more nation-states, for example, may be
referred to as engaging in diplomatic interaction by exchanging
missions or by participating In negotiations. A rebel group In
a state, with which governments of other states are establish-
ing contacts, may also be a participant. There are at present
groups and sub-groups of varied character, some territorial and
some nonterritorial. There are also a large number of supra-
and international organizations, both official and nonofficial.
Identification of the group or sub-group on behalf of which an.
elite is engaging in diplomacy is always Important. And
equally important is the Identification of the Individuals en-
gaged In strategy since the character of the particular in-*
dividual is likely to give rise to special issues of policy.
An individual participant may even belong to more than one
group, although his participation may be on behalf of only one
group. This description, therefore, focuses on Individual par-
ticipants, as well as on the groups on behalf of which the in-
dividuals act.
1. Officials of Nation-States
Officials of nation-states are considered first because
they currently possess the most prominent role in the diplo-
matic process. The different categories of officials who form
part of the machinery of diplomacy in a nation-state will be
discussed below. Those who actually make the policy decisions
in each nation-state, however, will not be identified because
that would entail an in-depth study of the politico-legal sys-
tem of each nation-state which cannot be done In a single
study. In a pluralist democracy, the issue of who supplies
even legal advice on matters of foreign policy--not to speak
of advice on political issues2 2--is an intricate question.23
22. See Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, "Declsion-Making in
Foreign Policy," in Kertesz & Fitzsimons, supra note 3,chap. 6.
23. E ., the position in the United Kngdom can be
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Even in a totalitarian or authoritarian state an apparently
all powerful dictator may be under pressure from a multipli-
city of sources.2 4
(a) Head of State
The range of participation of a Head of State Is de-
pendent upon the constitutional and political structure of the.
particular nation-state. The varied significance of the Head
of State in the United Kingdom,2 5 the United States, 26 France,27
and the U.S.S.R.2 8 illustrates the extent to which the role can
differ. Since the Head of State, however, is'the chief repre-
sentative of the nation-state in its international relations,
his acts or pronouncements constitute commitments on behalf of
the state.2 9
(b) Head of Government
The Head of Government, whether he is the Head of State
or not, is an important policy-maker.30 He may undertake
found in Clive Parry's paper in H. C. L. Merillat, ed., Legal
Advisers and Foreign Affairs 101-152 (1964).
24. Churchill remarks about Stalin in Closing Ring,
supra note 14, at 205, "behind the horseman sits black care."
On the pressures to which Bulganin and Khrushchev were subject,
see K. Eubank, The Summit Conferences 1919-1960, 148 (1966).
See also G. A. Craig & F. Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats 1919-
1939 chap. 8 (1953) (In citing this work below, the names of
the contributors of the individual chapters are not mentioned,
except when reference is made to a particular author's opinion
specifically).
25. See Sir Victor Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters 187
(1944); D. G-'Bi'shop, The Administration of British Foreign Re-
lations chap. 2 (1991).
26. Henry H. Jackson, ed., The Secretary of State and
the Ambassadors (papers of the Jackson sub-committee of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations) vii (1964).
27. Arts. 52 and 53 of the French Constitution.
28. Art. 49 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Jose
Maria Ruda sets out briefly some other models. Jose Maria
Ruda, The Final Acceptance of International Conventions 23-27
T 976).
29. See L. Oppenhelm, International Law, A Treatise,
Vol. I - Pea-c(8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1955) at 757; The
Nuclear Tests Case, I.C.J. Rep. 1974, at 269.
30. In a democratic set up, the Head of Government
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
negotiations or even gather intelligence for the purposes of
policy-making. The sharing of participation between the Head
of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs is a matter for
intra-governmental adjustment.
(c) Minister for Foreign Affairs
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has a different
name in some countries, is generally regarded as the most im-
portant agent of the nation-state for the conduct of its ex-
ternal relations. Separate ministries for the conduct of for-
eign relations were developed in Europe during the post-
Renaissance period. They emerged in a response to the need to
analyse and interpret the intelligence transmitted by diplo-
matic missions and to supply these missions with necessary
guidance 3l for the conduct of a coordinated foreign policy.
The Department of the Ministry, over which the Minister
presides, usually has a complex hierarchy and division of func-
tions among its sections. 3 2 Most of the personnel are in-
volved, however, in exchanging communication. In a foreign of-
fice there is generally a combination of a stable group of ca-
reer officials and a component of top officials who come and
go with changes in the ruling party. This latter group enables
the organization to adapt to new situations and to respond to
political pressures. 3 3
(d) Other Ministers and their Ministries
The minister for foreign affairs and the officials of
must accept some sharing arrangement of decision-making power.
The war memoires of Winston Churchill show that when he himself
conducted negotiations, at every stage he obtained the concur-
rence of the War Cabinet for the proposed agreements.
31. See Garret Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy 87 and
passim (Penguin Books, 1964).
32. Regarding the U.S. Department of State, see the
Brookings Institution Study, The Formulation and Administra-
tion of United States Foreign Policy (for the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 1960) (hereinafter cited as Brookings
Institution Foreign Policy Study) at 58; on the British Min-
Istry of Foreign and Commonwealth Relations, Christina Larner,
'The Organization and Structure of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office," in R. Boardman & A. J. R. Groom, eds., The Management
of Britain's External Relations 31 (1973); French Foreign Of-
fice, Bourbon-Busset, supra note 22.
33. For an account of the varied influences that oper-
ate on the minister for foreign affairs, see Ibid.
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his ministry are specifically assigned to the conduct of for-
eign affairs, but foreign affairs are not their exclusive do-
main. It is difficult today to differentiate between a na-
tion-state's internal and external matters. As a result, fi-
nance, commerce, agriculture, communications, health, scien-
tific affairs, and practically every other ministry have claims
for participation in the conduct of external relations.3 4 Of-
ficials of these ministries also become involved in diplomatic
negotiations and conferences. 35 The dominant position of the
foreign office in the conduct of diplomacy, therefore, is
questionable. A scholar who has studied the situation in the
United Kingdom remarks: "In many areas of Government activity
which involve international action or reaction, the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office is not the coordinating Department, but
one extra Department to be coordinated."3 6 He adds that "the
role could decline to that of a post office for specialist de-
partments, with diplomats abroad acting as door-openers for the
men from London." This last remark seems doubtful, however,
since the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at any time could claim
to have the expertise necessary to evaluate the political im-
plications of economic, commercial, and technological ques-
tions.
(e) Military Officials
Military officials are also significant participants in
diplomacy. History provides innumerable instances of military
officials being appointed as diplomatic officials. 37 There are
certain roles connected with the conduct of diplomacy, moreover,
where expertise in military strategy, tactics, and weaponry is
considered essential. Armistice negotiations, for example, are
generally entrusted to military officials. In addition,. mili-
34. See Frank Figgures, "The Treasury and External Re-
lations," in-Bardman and Groom, supra note 32, at 161-172;
also Peter Byrd, "Trade and Commerce in External Relations," in
id. 173-199; regarding the U.S., Brookings Institution Foreign
Pol icy Study at 64.
35. Figgures, supra note 34; D. G. Bishop, "The Cabinet
and Foreign Policy," in Boardman and Groom, supra note 32, at
138.
36. Figgures, supra note 34, at 196.
37. A major study on military people as diplomats is
Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy (1956); see also W. T. R.
Fox, "Diplomats and Military People," in Kertesz and Fitzsimons,
supra note 3, chap. 4; R. B. Mowat, Diplomacy and Peace, chap.
T -9 3 5).-
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tary attaches in diplomatic missions, the personnel of mili-
tary liaison missions, and the delegates to intergovernmental
organizations concerned with military planning are drawn from
the defense forces. 36
(f) Diplomatic Officials
Diplomatic officials, along with foreign office offi-
cials, are specially trained in the conduct of diplomacy. Dip-
lomatic missions in this century have grown enormously in size
as their functions have begun to expand.39 The size of a
mission will depend upon the interests which the sending nation-
state has in the receiving state, the expenditure which the
former can afford, the level of cordiality prevailing between
the two, and the extent to which the latter permits the mission
to perform its functions. The United States missions, for ex-
ample, in London and Moscow differ in size, and the United
States mission in Jondon differs from the United Kingdom miss-
ion in Washington.4
A generalized description of the structure and personnel
composition of diplomatic missions is not easy to give since
their sizes vary. Most of the diplomatic officials, however,
gather intelligence for formulating not merely the diplomatic
strategy, but all strategies of influence. Even two centuries
ago, the ambassador was required to report on all matters con-
sidered relevant to policy-making, beginning with the stresses
and strains in the royal household and ending with the condi-
tions of agriculture and industry.41 Reporting by the head of
the diplomatic missions today, however, is considered excessive
and a waste of resources. 42 Information gathered by secret
38. See Thomas S. Lough, "The Military Liaison Missions
in Germany,"-TJ. of Conf. Res. 258 (1967). On the British
delegation to the NATO, see Peter Nailor, "Defense Policy and
Foreign Policy," in Boardman and Groom, supra note 32, at 221,
229. On the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG)
and Defense Annual Review Teams (DART), see also Fox, supra
note 37, at 52.
39. Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Study, at Ill;
H. M. Jackson, supra note 26, at 64; Sir Douglas Busk, The
Craft of Diplomacy 21 (1964).
40. Ibid.; H. M. Jackson, supra note 26, at 64, 145.
There a view that the U.S. embassies are over-staffed, id. at
143.
41. Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat chap. 14 (1959).
42. See Philip Elliot & Peter.Golding, "The News Media
and Foreign Arfairs," in Boardman and Groom, supra note 32, at
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agents, limited in quantum but vitally important, is not neces-
sarily transmitted through the head of the diplomatic mission,
though indeed he is kept informed of the activities of the
agents .43
The diplomatic officials are by no means high level pol-
icy-makers; they mainly serve to implement a recommended policy.
They can make policy only within a narrow range left to them
after they have been given instructions. Implementation in-
volves engaging in consultation or negotiation with the offi-
cials of the nation-state or international organization to
which they are accredited, or participating in conference or
parliamentary diplomacy. The advent of rapid transportation
has created the practice of the Heads of Government and Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs directly participating in consulta-
tions and negotiations. 44 The diplomatic officials also serve
as agents to receive or transmit communications to or from the
foreign office of the receiving nation-state or the officials
of the international organization to which they are accredited.45
(g) Consular Officials
The consul's main function is to safeguard and promote
the commercial interests of his nation-state. Thus, they gath-
er intelligence relevant to commerce. In a nation-state in
which the sending state has no diplomatic representation, how-
ever, the consulate may perform several functions belonging to
the diplomatic official, including negotiation. But even when
there are diplomatic missions, the consul may have relations
305, 311; also the Report of the Duncan Committee (Review Com-
mittee on Overseas Representation, Report, Cmd. 4107, 1969) re-
garding United Kingdom; Brookings Institution Foreign Policy
Study at 114; H. M. Jackson, supra note 26, at 23-24.
43. This is true with the U.S., but the information
supplied by the secret services forms only about 4 or 5 per-
cent of the overall intelligence coming from different sources.
See Thayer, supra note 41, at 175.
44. In considering the criticism that the practice of
the Secretary of State himself engaging in negotiations con-
tributes to the undermining of the importance of the ambassa-
dor; it is stated that "it is a consequence primarily of swift-
er transportation and is akin to growing centralization of most
governmental affairs." Brookings Institution Foreign Policy
Sd, at 110.
45. Sir Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice 61
(4th ed. by Sir Nevile Bland, 1957) describes the various forms
of communication generally used.
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with the local authorities in the consular district resembling
those between the diplomatic mission and the central authority.4 6
(h) Other Field Missions
Organizations such as the Agency for International De-
velopment, the United States Information Agency, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency are primarily concerned with the oper-
ations specifically assigned to them. But their duties entail
reporting on their work to parent departments, and keeping the
local ambassador informed. United States personnel policy, it
is reported, moreover, encourages young officers to present re-
ports even on matters outside their assigned responslbilities.47
(i) Legislative Officials
Since the conduct of foreign relations is primarily an
executive responsibility in all nation-states, the level of'
participation by the members of the legislative branch is lower
than that of executive officials. Individual members, however,
may be appointed on an ad hoc basis as diplomats to handle a
particular task, or more commonly, to be a delegate to inter-
national conferences or organizations. In the event of such an
appointment, they also attain diplomatic status.
As a collective body, the legislators of a nation-state
exercise considerable influence on the foreign policy of that
state, inasmuch as they control both the purse and domestic
legislative process. In many nation-states, the power to rat-
ify international agreements is vested in the legislature or
one of its committees. In other states, the legislature must,
at least, be informed of the contents of an agreement before
ratification, to give it an opportunity to express disapproval
or to prevent ratification. 48 A sharing of power exists,
therefore, between the legislature and the executive over the
conduct of diplomacy. 49
In actual practice, individual legislators play a more
significant role than appears possible from their formal status
46. Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice 60 (1961).
47. See H. M. Jackson, supra note 26, at 24.
48. J.-M. Ruda, supra note 28, at 23, gives a short ac-
count of the practices obtaining in some countries. In Eng-
land, the Crown ratifies on the advice of the Cabinet, but
since 1929 treaties are laid before Parliament before ratifica-
tion.
49. Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Study, at 22-
25; H. M. Jackson, supra note 26, at 59.
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as legislators. Contacts with foreign officials and nonof-
ficials influence their activity in the legislature, and may
also cause them to make representations to the executive for
whatever interest they favor. This characteristic Is more
prevalent in nation-states like the United States, where the
legislature is highly independent of the executive.
Legislators also have opportunities for communicating
with their counterparts in other nation-states. There are
nonofficial international organizations which provide an In-
stitutional framework for such contacts--for example, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Latin American Parliament. 50
The European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the Council of
Europe are exceptional, moreover, in that they have Assem-
blies In which the members of parliaments from the member
states are represented. Interestingly, the members of the
Assembly usually disregard their national identifications and
divide on the lines of political parties of the same or simi-
lar ideologies. 51 The Assembly of the Council of Europe func-
tions as a good instrument of parliamentary diplomacy, by
initiating proposals for international agreements, by ensuring
that negotiations for such agreements are initiated and pur-
sued, and by giving approval to the texts negotiated to make
formalization easier for the member states.52
(j) Judicial Officials
Participation by judicial officials is marginal. They
may be considered for appointment as ad hoc diplomats, and
when they visit foreign nation-states, the executive officials
of their own nation-state or the visiting one may use them as
vehicles of communication. But there are also nonofficial in-
ternational associations of judges, such as the World Associa-
tion of Judges (WAJ) and the International Union of Judges. 53
Communication among members of these forums may eventually in-
fluence the policies of their nation-states in respect to the
structures, procedures, and values sought in their national
legal systems.
50. The former was established in 1889 and has now its
office at Geneva, and the latter was established in 1964.
51. P. S. R. F. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Commun-
ity Law 124 (1972); A. H. Robertson, The Law of International
Institutions 39 (1961).
52. See A. H. Robertson, The Council of Europe 214 -
(1956).
53. The WAJ was established at Geneva under the aus-
pices of the World Peace Through Law Centjer. The Interna-
tional Union of Judges was established at Salzburg (Austria)
in 1953.
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(k) Officials of "Unrecognized Nation-States
and Governments"
Groups are frequently encountered in the world arena
that do not have a definite territorial base on which to claim
the status of a nation-state or that have a certain degree of'
control over a portion of the earth's surface and are in pur-
suit of gaining unchallenged authority over it to become a
nation-state. As soon as such an aspirant group attains a suf-
ficient measure of strength to withstand the established gov-
ernment's effort at suppression, external elites may contact
the group's leaders. Such contact is a necessity if the group
obtains control over a portion of territory in which the ex-
ternal elite's interests are located. It is appealing when
the success of the rebel group holds out a promise of gain.
It may also develop out of sympathy for the cause of the group.
Contacts of this character are sought to be legitimized'at
some stage by the "recognition" of the group as a "liberation
movement," as insurgents, belligerents, as a de facto govern-
ment, de jure government, or de facto or de Jure nation-
state. Before the grant of de jure recognition, however, the
group's leaders are not admii-ed to the full-fledged institu-
tions of diplomacy.
(1) Officials of "Governments in Exile"
Occasionally, a serious crisis forces the ruling elite
to leave its territory and take shelter in a foreign nation-
state. Such "governments" continue to enjoy recognition and
may be admitted to diplomatic intercourse by the governments
that recognize the elite, out of sympathy for its cause.
2. International Officials
The establishment of the League of Nations was shortly
followed by the crystallization of the concept of the "Inter-
national civil servant."5 4 These international officials con-
tinue to be nationals of their respective nation-states, but
they are ex ected to assume perspectives of an international
char ac te..-5
54. For an account of the evolution, see Geor es
Langrod, The International Civil Service chap. I (T963J. The
chief characteristics of international civil service made their
first appearance in the International Institute of Agriculture,
established at Rome in 1905.
55. Balfour Report, LON, Off. Journ. I, No. 4 (June
1920) at 137; also A. W. Rovine, The First Fifty Years, The
Secretary-General in World Politics 1920-1970 34 (1970).
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International officials include all those officials ap-
pointed as members of the secretariats or bureaus of intergov-
ernmental organizations. The number of such organizations to-
day is approximately 280. We may also include in the category
of international officials all those that are appointed on an
ad hoc basis to carry out specified tasks, such as the observa-
0'oin-nd reporting of a particular situation or the conduct of
mediation. A detailed and exhaustive description of all the
organizations, their employees, the structures of authority in
which they are located, and the range of their competence and
participation cannot be undertaken here;5 6 it is possible only
to focus on major categories. For what is of interest is not
the actual number of these organizations or their employees,
but rather the magnitude of their role in the diplomatic
process within the world arena.
The secretariat or bureau of each organization, es-
pecially of the U.N. or one of its specific agencies, Is head-
ed by an official called the Secretary or Director-General. 5 7
He stands at the top of a hierarchy consisting of aides and
assistants. In some capacities, this chief executive can
emerge as almost as important a participant as the heads of
governments.58
The relationship among intergovernmental organizations
resembles the one that exists among nation-states. Even the
Specialized Agencies of the U.N., each of which has its own
constituent treaty, stand with respect to one another as "sov-
ereign organizations." 59 The relationships among them were
established by agreements, and their activities are coordi-
nated by a process of consultation, negotiation, persuasion,
and agreement. So far, the diplomatic process among these
organizations has not been studied systematically, but an idea
56. It may be possible to give the total number of em-
ployees in the various secretariats, but difficult to specify
precisely who participates in the diplomatic process. It is
possible that every one of them has some connection or other,
however insignificant It might be.
57. The E.E.C. is headed by a Commission of 14 members,
including a president and five vice-presidents.
58. M. Virally observes about the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral, that he "found himself on a footing of equality with
heads of greatest Powers. . .. " Langrod, supra note 54, at
254.
59. A. Cordier & W. Foote eds. I Public Papers of the
Secretaries-General of the United Nations 13 (1969); also
Langrod, supra note 54, at 19
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of the amount of communication that flows among their offi-
cials can be gained from the emergence in recent decades of
the following practices: (a) Many Specialized Agencies and
other international organizations have in their secretariats
an external relations department, very much similar to the
foreign offices of nation-states. 6 0 (b) The organizations
send representatives to the meetings of other organizations
to observe, report, and sometimes participate.61 (c) Agree-
ments are made among the organizations.62 (d) The organiza-
tions maintain at the seat of other organizations liaison
officers who function like diplomatic officials of nation-
states. 63 (e) Regular and sustained communication exists
among the officials of different organizations, especially
within such organizational frameworks as the Administrative
Committee on Coordination (ACC), established by the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations, and of the Technical
Assistance Board (TAB).6 4 Coordination of this character is
not confined to the U.N. family of organizations. The Com-
mission of European Communities, for example, takes part In
the activities of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and has a permanent mission at the
seat of the latter.65
Besides this complex network of elite communication
connecting the various intergovernmental organizations, inter-
national officials maintain communication with officials of
the nation-states. Soon after the establishment of the League
of Nations, its first Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond,
initiated communications with governments of various nation-
60. S.D. Kertesz, The Quest for Peace Through Diplo-
macy 85 (1967). He states this to be a common feature with
most of the specialized agencies.
61. Id. The agreements concluded between the spe-
cialized agencies and Economic Social Council for providing
,such participation.
62. On such agreements, see J.W. Schneider, Treaty-
Making Power of International Organizations (1963).
63. Kertesz, supra note 60, at 85, refers to the prac-
tice of appointing laison officers.
64. On the ACC, see Hill,. "The Administrative Coordi-
nation Committee," in E. Luard ed. The Evolution of Inter-
national Organizations 104 (1966). The TAB consists' of the
chief executives of the organizations participating in the
technical assistance programs.
65. Kertesz, supra note 60, at 103. It is stated that
the OECD has established special relationship with 19 IGOs.
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states, and the latter, in their turn, established permanent
missions at the League's seat in spite ?f the fact that Sir
Eric disliked suci permanent missions.6b He preferred com-
munication directly with governments. Since the establish-
ment of the U.N., permanent missions of members and various
observer missions of non-members have become an almost uni-
versal phenomenon, not only within the U.N., but also within
many intergovernmental organizations. These missions facili-
tate continuous consultation with governments.67The unique
and significant role which these missions, especially those
accredited to the U.N., play in the diplomatic process was de-
scribed by the former U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hamerskjold,
in an address in 1959.68 Having in view the facilities of
communication which these missions have, and the influential
position of the office of the Secretary-General, Hamerskjold
stated on another occasion, "I cannot find any part of my
present task more challenging than the one wh'ich consists in
trying to develop all the potentialities of that unique diplo-
matic instrument which the Charter has created in the institu-
tion called the Secretary-General of the United Nations." 69
A large part of the history of the League and the United Na-
tions is indeed an account of the role played by the Secretary-
General and his aides in the world diplomatic process. 70
Diplomacy of international officials vis-a-vis offi-
cials of nation-states encompasses the concerns that exist be-
tween the particular organization and a particular nation-
state or group of nation-states. Important among such con-
cerns is the treatment to be accorded the organization's per-
sonnel who enter the territory of a nation-state. This was
explicitly set forth, for example, in the "Status of Forces
Agreement" entered into with government of Cyprus by the-Secrer
tary-General U Thant before the introduction of U.N. troops in-
66. Rovlne, supra note 55, at 48; Langrod, supra
54, at 128; S. Bailey, The Secretariat of the United-iations
57 (Rev. ed. 1964) .
67. Regarding how members maintain consultation with
the Secretary-General on a continuous basis see S.
Schwebel, The Secretary-General of the United Nations 139
(1952). Even regional organizations such as the E.E.C. have
missions accredited to them, and the E.E.C. has missions ac-
credited to it by 69 states. Kertesz, supra note 60, at
101, Il1.
68. Cordier & Foote, supra note 59, Vol. IV, at 364.
69. Id.,iVol. 11, at Tr.7
70. A detailed historical account may be found in
Rovine, supra note 55, and Langrod, supra note 54.
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to Cyprus in 1964.71 Such concerns aside, to a present-day
student of nonviolent settlement of international conflicts,
the role played by the U.N. Secretary-General and his aides
in mediation and conciliation processes is a highly engaging
field of investigation. 72
International officials outside the U.N. too have
played a significant role in this regard.73 But the con-
cerns for the officials of any particular organization include
promotion of all its objectives.
Recently, groups fighting for territorial bases to gain
the status of nation-states or dissident groups within estab-
lished states struggling for recognition as separate entities,
sometimes referred to as "liberation movements," have been ac-
corded limited access to the arenas of international organiza-
tions. Most notable among such groups is the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization. It is allowed to have an observer mission
at the U.N. and to participate in the proceedings of Its or-
gans. It is given access to the specialized agencies and con-
ferences. This trend requires communication between the inter-
national officials and the leaders of such movements, even
though some of the members of the particular organization are
hostile to the group or "liberation movement" in question.74
International officials also come into contact with
leaders of nonofficial groups who are In pursuit of certain
values, that a nation-state by itself is ordinarily incapable
of supplying. These groups figuring as international nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) are nearly ten times as numerous
as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). 75 In short, inter-
71. U.N. Doct. S/5634, March 31, 1964; see also Rovine,
supra note 55, at 383.
72. The literature on this subject is extensive. See
Rovine, supra note 55, and the bibliography given therein.
73. The World Bank successfully mediated in the 1950's
between India and Pakistan over the Indus waters; the OEEC, the
predecessor of OECD, mediated in 1950's the dispute between the
U.K. and Iceland concerning fisheries; the NATO unsuccessfully
tried to conciliate the dispute between Greece and Turkey.
74. In relation to the admission of the P.L.O. to the
World Employment Conference, Geneva, as an observer see N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1976, at 12, col. 3. For the observer missions of
the P.L.O. and others, of the total of 12 see id. Sept. 21, 1976,
at 3, col. 1; also Gross, "Voting in tne 3iecurity Council
and the P.L.O.," 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 470 (1976).
75. On the NGOs, see Lador-Lederer, International Non-
Governmental Organizations (1963.
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national officials are significant participants in the diplo-
matic process. They interact with officials of nation-states,
of other IGOs, and of NGOs.
All international officials, however, do not partici-
pate in every level of the diplomatic process. Most of the
officials are involved in the analysis and interpretation of
intelligence and in the formulation of proposals to be con-
sidered by higher officials or organs of the organization.76
This work is also of use to officials of nation-states who do
not have an adequate intelligence machinery. 7 7 The intelli-
gence consists mostly of information supplied by nation-states,
but it also includes reports prepared by the field units, spe-
cial committees, or commissions which the organization sends
to different areas of the world.78 More importantly, the top
executives of the organizations, especially the Secretary- or
Director-General, in the course of their contacts with offi-
cials and nonofficials of nation-states, gather information
which will not ordinarily be accessible to diplomatic officials
of nation-states.
Participation in the exchange of communication is lim-
ited to a small section of international officials nominated
by the organs of the organization, usually the organization's
chief executives and officials authorized by the chief execu-
tive.79 The policy of the organization is determined by its
authorized organ and subject to the decision of such organ,
and the provisions of the constituent instrument of the organ-
ization by the chief executive and his advisers.80
76. Robinson, "Strengthening the Secretariat," 296
Annals 137 (1954), remarks that "the Secretariat of the U.N. Is
the greatest institute of social research in the world." See
also Langrod, sura note 54, passim on the work done by the
secretariats of the League, the I.L.O., and the U.N.
77. See Sheldon W. Simon, "The Asian States and the
ILO: New Problems in International Consensus," 10 J. of Conf.
Res. 21 (1960); also Langrod, supra note 54, at 144.
78. Rovine, supra note 55, at 457.
79. The U.N. organs first constituted committees or
commissions to ascertain facts, mediate and conciliate dif-
ferences, but later developed the practice of entrusting the
matter to the Secretary-General, who in his turn deputed some-
body, including persons outside the Secretariat.
80. The troika agitation in 1960 was followed by the
evolving of an arrangement by U Thant whereby the Secretary-
General came to have 8 Under-Secretaries to advise him on Im-
portant matters. See Lan2rod, supra note 54, at 282; Bailey,
supra note 66, at 73-; U.N. Doct. SG/106, Nov. 3, 1961.
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The influence exercised by the officials, however, on
the parliamentary diplomacy in the organs of the organization
is more extensive. Studies by the secretariat bring to the
attention of members matters to be discussed. This procedure
implicitly projects certain values. The officials prepare the
draft agenda and thus influence the assignment of priorities
among the items for consideration. They advise the presiding
officer on procedural matters that affect to a certain extent
the outcome of the debates before the organs. Exercising
their right to speak before the organs and assisting in the
drafting of the resolution, the officials further influence
the outcome.81
3. Nonofficials
Nonofficial groups that enter diplomatic interactions
may be divided into three categories: (a) transnational"
political parties, (b) pressure groups that seek to influence
public order decisions but are not in pursuit of power, and
(c) private associations that are primarily interested in val-
ues other than power.
Transnational political parties attempt to develop simi-
lar power structures within several nation-states with the
eventual goal of establishing central direction and collabora-
tive practices. The trend toward central direction reached a
high water mark among the communist parties immediately after
World War II, but subsequently took a reverse turn. 82 An ex-
ample of central direction, however, is the fact that the
First Secretary of the Communist Party has negotiated treaties
with nation-states."3 A high level collaborative goal also
exists among the Christian Democrat, Socialist, and Liberal
political parties in Europe. Pressure groups and private as-
sociations communicate with national and international offi-
cials, supplying them with information useful foe formulation
of policy or with information about violations of prescrip-
81. Schwebel, sura note 67, at 69, 78-86;
Simon, supra note 77, at 2-
2.The conference of the communist parties in July
1976 brought out this trend vividly.
83. The origin of this practice can be traced to
M. Khrushchev. See C. Bohlen, Witness to History
1929-1969 at 406-T973).But in the absence of party-to-party
relationship, People's Republic of China refused to accept the
condolence message sent by the Soviet Communist Party on the
occasion of the death of Mao Tse-Tung, see N.Y. Times, Sept.l1,
1976, at 7, col. I.
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tions. They also recommend policies, as well as supply ap-
praisals of past policies. A large number of nonofficial
organizations have consultative arrangements with the Economic
and Social Council .and other international organizations.
For various reasons, officials of nation-states some-
times use nonofficial agents for conveying diplomatic communi-
cation. 8 4 In recent decades, nonofficial associations have
even developed a communication network, especially in Europe,
which significantly affects the diplomatic process. Concern-
ing this network, an observant scholar writes: 85
The deliberate policies of integration, the
widespread activities of corporations, the
growth of inter-governmental organizations,
the ease of communication and the interna-
tional character of technology . . . have
made private organizations more important.
They have, to a large extent, been respons-
ible for the growth of extensive political
networks and information systems below the
state level. Such political networks among
professional associations for example have
been used to counter or support policies
proposed or initiated by states.
Nonofficials may sometimes be appointed as ad hoc diplo-
mats by nation-states or international organizations. At the
present time, for example, scientists are being included in a
number of delegations to negotiations or conferences.8 6 When
appointed, however, the individuals attain official status.
B. Perspectives
Participants engage in diplomatic interaction to achieve
their objectives, or in other words, to satisfy their value de-
mands. These demands are made in the name of identities great-
er than the ego-self, and the identifications are based upon
expectations or assumptions of fact about the past, present,
and future. In the following section, the objectives, identi-
84. Mattingly , supra note 31; Craig & Gilbert, sup
note 24, at 20, 550; Figgures, supra note 34, at 177.
85. J. Harrod, "State Management of Private Foreign
Policy," in Boardman & Groom, supra note 32, at 289, 294.
On the role of private organizations, see E. Miles, 'Transna-
tionalism in Space: Inner and Outer," 25 Int'l. Org. 602 (1971).
86. For a case study on participation by scientists in
diplomacy, see H. K. Jacobson & Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scien-
tists and Politicians (1966).
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fications, and expectations of those that operate the diplo-
matic strategy will be discussed. The information about these
perspectives is derived from the declarations of the partici-
pants themselves and what can be inferred from their conduct.
]. Demands (Objectives)
Generally, the objective of those employing the diplo-
matic strategy, or for that matter, any strategy, is the maxi-
mization of all values of the representative group, and econ-
omizing the investment of values to attain this goal. In
reference to the diplomatic strategy, however, the objectives
may be divided between authoritative power and all other values.
One sphere of authoritative power is the production and
allocation of desired events, which can be referred to collec-
tively as the community's public order. Another sphere per-
tains to the procedures of decision which establish, maintain,
modify, or even revolutionize the public order. Thus, a con-
stitutive process of authoritative decision makes decisions
relating both to its own operation and to the shaping and dis-
tribution of values among participants in community life.
Those employing the diplomatic strategy aim first to
optimize their communication with all the elites engaged in
the constitutive process, to increase their influence within
a variety of functions of decision, i.e., intelligence, pro-
motion (recommendation), prescription, invocation, applica-
tion, appraisal, and termination. This pursuit springs from
an obvious interest in influencing the procedures of the con-
stitutive process. The acquisition of such information de-
pends on access to all the related arenas and institutions of
decision. Hence, governments try to become members of as many
international organizations as may be useful and to establish
diplomatic missions in as many foreign nation-states as pos-
sible in order to maintain contact with the officials of those
states.
Secondly, the actors employing the diplomatic strategy
aim to increase their role In public order decisions having
value shaping and distributional consequences. The number of
nation-states that are currently participating in the con-
ferences convened by the United Nations is an indication of
this concern. The strategies fo maintaining public order can
be both persuasive and coercive.97 All participants in the
process of public order decisions, In accordance with the
principle of economy of means, however, prefer the persuasive,
87. For a detailed description of the strategies, see
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 7, at 403.
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or at least the non-violent, means to the violent ones. For
example, diplomatic methods of settling of disputes, such as
negotiation, lending good offices, mediation, conciliation,
etc., are preferred over war as instruments of national policy.
Participants in diplomacy, therefore, will seek to maximize
persuasion and to minimize the incidence and intensity of co-
ercion in public order decisions.
Thirdly, and more significantly, in a community which
transcends the nation-state, and thus which is not integrated,
the elites will be competitive, as may be expected. They will
use the diplomatic strategy, therefore, to see that their pre-
ferred system of public order prevails.8 8
Finally, in the social process involving pursuit of
values other than authoritative power, each participant aims
at acquiring values from others that his group does not have,
preferably by giving nothing in exchange. Sometimes the ob-
jective may be merely to influence another participant to re-
frain from a particular course of action. The objective may
also be to reach arrangements for future acquisitions or to
collaborate in joint ventures. In general, elites will seek
to maintain communication with other elites, and thereby ac-
quire enlightenment (information or intelligence) and affec-
tion (cordiality in mutual relations) on a continuing basis.
The statement of objectives thus is rather descriptive,
and while it may help one to appreciate the intricacies of
the techniques of diplomatic strategy, it may not aid in
choosing a particular objective or in determining its impact
on aid in determining the impact of a particular objective on
the world community. To analyse these problems, the objec-
tives should be distinguished in terms of (a) the magnitude of
the innovation sought in the existing pattern of public order
in the shaping and distribution of values, (b) the impact of
the Innovation on the interacting participants in terms of the
values gained or lost, (c) the nature of interest sought by
the particular participant, whether inclusive or exclusive, com-
mon or special, and (d) whether the character of the objective
conforms to the basic goals of the public order. It may be
added that the perceptions of these aspects of the objectives
by an interacting participant and by an external observer are
unlikely to be the same. The focus here is mainly on an ob-
serverls perceptions.
(a) Magnitude of Innovation
Realization of the objective may or may not entail a
88. McDougal & Lasswell, "The Identification and Ap-
praisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," 53 Am.J.Int'l L.
1 (1959).
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radical restructuring of the public order system, perhaps with
serious deprivations to other members of the world community.
The number of participants affected by the deprivation may
vary. The demand may be for a mutually profitable arrangement
or one that falls into the zero-sum pattern with a heavy pay-
off. This would not include "vital interests"; however, thes e
are usually claimed to be beyond the purview of negotiation or
voluntary exchange. Sovereignty and political independence,
for example, may be placed in this category.
(b) Value Acquisition or Deprivation
It is possible to have the objective of conserving the
existing position of the group; however, as acquisition of new
values is the ethos of human life, an individual or group will
rarely be contented with what they have. At the most, they
may be content in reference to some specific values or objects
such as "territory." The distinction is meaningful only when
it refers to a situation in which acquisition is being sought
at the expense of others.
(c) Nature of the Interests Sought
Interests are distinguished as either common or spe-
cial. Common interests are those held by most actors, the
realization of which may be beneficial to the community in
general. Special interests are those demanded by a few for
their own benefit requiring deprivations to others. Com-
mon interests may be inclusive in the sense that they affect
more than a single actor or exclusive in that they affect a
single participant. A typical inclusive common interest is,
for example, the freedom of access to outer space. An exclu-
sive common interest is national security against aggression.
A special interest, such as that claimed by. the ruling elites
in Indonesia and South Africa, is the maintenance of an apart-
heid racial policy. The nature of the interest sought in any
particular situation, therefore, enables us to distinguish-
among objectives.
(d) Conformity with Public Order Goals
The demands made with rdspect to public order, particu-
larly for innovations, may or.nlay not be compatible with the
basic public order goals which.an outside observer might posit:
An arrangement reached by part-icipants in the social process
is permitted to function only within the limits set down by
the public order. Contractual relationships receive protec-
tion only insofar as they originate in accordance with the con-
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ditions prescribed by the public order system. The doctrine
of jus cogens has great relevance in this connection. A pro-
posed diplomatic settlement of a situation is frequently
judged as to whether it disturbs the existing order and sta-
bility in a particular area.
The objectives of the participants may also be de-
scribed in terms of the policy responses desired by the other
party to the interaction. These desired responsesmay be to ab-
stain from a particular policy, to withdraw from a policy that
is being pursued, to cooperate with those operating the strat-
egy, to modify an existing pol cy, or to reconstruct the en-
tire process of policy-making.o9
The objectives of negotiation conducted on behalf of
nation-states have been classified by a leading scholar in
two major categories: those which have agreement as the goal,
and those having other goals. The first group is further sub-
divided on the basis of the nature of the agreement desired:
(a) renewal of existing agreements, (b) termination of abnormal
situations, (c) redistribution of values, and (d) the ushering
in of new institutions, relationships, or undertakings. The
objectives not envisaging an agreement are (a) maintaining con-
tact, (b) avoiding violent action, (c) intelligence gathering,
(d) deception, (e) propaganda, and (f) impact on third par-
ties. 9 0 This analysis of the objectives, however, Is narrower
than the one used in this study since negotiation is only a
part of the operation of a diplomatic strategy.
2. Identifications
Each individual participating in diplomacy is sometimes
concerned with personal aspirations: advancement in career,
fame as a diplomat, or making a great contribution to mankind.
But one also responds to wider identifications that are shaped
by one's cultural background, upbringing, and experiences in
life. 91 These identifications necessarily change, sometimes
89. See Lasswell, "Political Factors in the Formulation
of National Strategy," 6 Naval War College Rev. 19, 34 (1954).
Differentiation on these lines may not throw much light on pol-
icy issues.
90. See Ikle, supra note 4, chaps. 3 and 4. The first
set of objectives are termed as "extension," "nomalization,"
"redistribution" and "innovation."
91. See in this connection Parsons & Shils, "Values,
Motives and Systems of Action," in T. Parsons & E. Shils, eds.,
Towards a General Theory of Action 45, 128 (1954). Between
the two World Wars, Dr. Benes of Czechoslovakia, for instance,
realized that the Czech national aspirations coincided with a
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gradually and sometimes abruptly; therefore, when we refer to
identifications, it is implied that they are not static.
Since in diplomacy every participant acts for a group,
each individual is required to identify openly with the group.
A minister of foreign affairs, for example, can express in his
public speeches only his identification with his own nation-
state. And yet when he approaches his counterpart in another
nation-state, he is likely to search for common symbols of
identification to influence the latter In agreeing to col-
laborative arrangements.9 2 Being "neighbors" is a simple basis
of identification, but wider bases with more significant im-
plications are being maritime or land-locked, East or West,
North or South, developed or developing, etc. At the farthest
extreme, there is identification with the whole of humanity.
It is also possible that one may interact while adhering to
his own different identification.
International officials are expected to assume identi-
fication transcending that of any nation-state including their
own. The identifications expected of them were clarified by
DagHammarskjoldin explaining the Implications of Art. 99 of
the United Nations Charter:9 1
What does that mean, an international inde-
pendent responsibility? Well, it does not
mean to speak for all sixty [members of the
U.N. at the time], not in the sense that you
represent what all the sixty think or feel,
because you have, after all, to give different
kinds of weight to the votes. People have
their own private interests which are not the
general interests. I mean by sixty in this
case what should be the voice, the interest,
and the wishes of a world of free, independent
nations which are not blinded by short-term
interests or misleading ideologies. (Emphasis
supplied.)
stable and peaceful Europe; therefore, he gave the Czech for-
eign policy an internationalist and European orientation. See
Craig & Gilbert, supra note 24, at 102.
92. One may refer in this connection to the famous
memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, "On the Present State of British
Relations with France and Germany," written in 1907. G.P.
Gooch and Harold Temperly eds. 3 British Documents on -he Ori-
gins of the War, Vol. III, 402 (1928).
93. Address at meeting of International Non-Govern-
mental Organizations, London (Mar. 19, 1954) reprinted in
Cordier & Foote, supra note 59, Vol. II, at 278.
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Whether these expectations are realized in practice is another
issue.9 4
While nonofficials organized as transnational groups
generally assume transnational identifications, the groups
which confine their activity to national level may assume sub-
national, national, or transnational identifications. Irreden-
tists, for example, seeking to gain recognition as a nation-
state, emphasize the symbols of a separate national existence
and those that unite them with larger groups outside, such as
ethnic or religious ties. But leaders of groups other than ir-
redentists keep their distinct identifications at a lower level
and adhere to national identifications. This is evident from
the tendency of political parties in stable democracies to make
foreign policy "continuous," "bipartisan," or "national," while
emphasizing at the same time the difference in their ideologies
and programs. 95
3. Expectations
Each participant enters the diplomatic arena with a set
of expectations; he is also aware that others may have differ-
ent expectations. Since participation is on behalf of a group,
the .individual actor generally subordinates his personal ex-
pectations to those held by the leaders and members of the
group as a whole. Hence, diplomats operating abroad are re-
quired to act strictly according to instructions and their un-
derlying assumptions.9 6 The chief decision-makers, moreover,
cannot afford to be Indifferent to public opinion on policy
issues.
Expectations may be widely shared among the leaders of
different groups. For example, there are now the common ex-
pectations that a major nuclear war will destroy all human
94. The personnel composition of the secretariats of
the League of Nations and the U.N. has been the subject of ex-
tensive debate because of the belief that the employees exert
Influence in favor of their respective nation-states. See
Rovine, supra note 55, at 37; Langrod, supra note 54, at 93.
95. The principle of continuityrsfoll owed in the
United Kingdom and in the United States and, perhaps, in all
nation-states that have attained a certain level of stability.
See Brookinas Institution Foreign Policy Study, at 26 (United
States); Bishop, supra note 25, ch. 6 (United Kingdom).
96. Exceptional are the cases of diplomats, such as
Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador in Germany from
1937 until the outbreak of World War II. See Bishop, su
note 25, at 276; Craig & Gilbert, supra note 24, at 538.
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civilization, that a small war with conventional weapons has
the potentiality of escalating into a major nuclear war, and
that a crisis situation might lead to an outbreak of violence
if not diffused by diplomatic procedures. On the other hand,
expectations differ sharply about the suitability for progress
and well-being of the patterns of political, social, or eco-
nomic organization currently existing in different nation-
states.
C. Arenas
Many diplomatic interactions take place in fairly stable
patterns. Insofar as these patterns relate to the pursuit of
formal and effective power by the interacting elites, we will
refer to them as arenas. Actually the diplomatic process In-
volves pursuit of all values, and so a comprehensive account
of the interactions might include a description not only of
arenas, but of 'markets" (pertaining to wealth), "forums" (re-
lating to enlightenment), etc. But the focus in this study is
on interactions for power and on policies that underlie or
should guide authoritative decisions or decisions based upon
formal and effective power. Thus, the discussion here will be
confined to arenas only.
The different features of the arenas established and
maintained by the elites may be classified on the basis of
their (a) institutional structures, (b) the structures of
authority therein, (c) the spatial or geographical features,
(d) the temporal feature (duration), and (e) the crisis fea-
ture. Access to the arenas may be distinguished as (a) free
or restricted, and (b) voluntary or compulsory.
i. Establishment and Maintenance
(a) Institutional Structures
The institutional structures may be distinguished on
the basis of the practices involved: (i) classical diplo-
matic,97 (ii) parliamentary diplomatic, (iii) parliamentary,
(iv) adjudicative, and (v) executive.
97. The expression "classical diplomatic" is used here
to refer to what is most commonly called "diplomatic," i.e.,
the practice of communication exchange, consultation and nego-
tiation. The expression "diplomacy" is used in this paper to
refer to the whole process of inter-elite communication, and
"classical diplomacy" to the more limited practice of communi-
cation, consultation and negotiation among the elites.
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(i) Classical Diplomatic: The diplomatic process is
most commonly used by an elite with other elites; each may be-
come informed about the other's perspectives, images of others,
and capabilities, as well as conveying its own perspectives,
images of others, etc. It is also common for either to con-
sult on selected issues with a view to developing a consensus
on them, without aiming at any specific agreements.9 8 But
sometimes the discussions will be directed to reaching spe-
cific agreements; this is generally referred to as negotiation.
Communication, consultation, and negotiation, moreover, may
take place on a bilateral basis or in a conference.
Bilateral: The most common pattern of diplomatic in-
teraction Is the bilateral. Bilateral interactions are pro-
moted by the organizational framework provided by the foreign
offices and diplomatic missions exchanged among nation-states.
Diplomatic missions are accorded several privileges and im-
munities by virtue of prescriptions which have developed over
centuries by custom, and these privileges and immunities facil-
itate the operation of the missions and furnish the chief per-
sonnel of the missions with authority, respect, and dignity.
Consulates and other field missions supplement the work of
diplomatic missions, and they are also accorded some immuni-
ties and privileges. A large amount of interaction takes
place in these bilateral arenas, and many problems are re-
duced without ever receiving public notice.
The permanent and observer missions to international
organizations which have developed In recent decades facilitate
Interactions between the groups that have established the mis-
sions, the officials of such missions, and the officials of the
particular international organizations. Another recent devel-
opment, the establishment of liaison offices between inter-
national organizations, facilitates communication among the of-
ficials of the liaison offices and the international organiza-
tion to which they are assigned, and the officials of the per-
manent or observer missions to the organization.
Bilateral interactions also take place outside these or-
ganizational settings. The history of diplomacy started with
ad hoc diplomatic missions, and the rise of permanent diplo-
matic missions since the fifteenth century has not completely
supplanted ad hoc missions. It is still common, moreover, for
Heads of State or Government, Foreign Ministers, and other
high officials of two nation-states to meet when necessary and
to engage in communication exchange. In fact, the bilateral
pattern is so common that it is fundamental to all other forms
of interaction.
9U. For the distinction between consultation and nego-
tiation, see Kertesz, supra note 60, at 136.
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The setting for bilateral exchange of communication may
be formal or Informal. It may be held in the foreign office
or some other office, In a cocktail lounge, at a breakfast,
luncheon or dinner table, or In the lobby of a conference hall.
Formal procedural rules rarely control the discussions, and
the agenda may be determined freely by choice of both parties..99
Even when meeting In the formal setting of an office, the par-
ticipants may declare the discussions to be un-official so as
not to commit their governments.10 0 Free, intimate, and frank
exchange of views is possible In this manner, and participants
can form realistic expectations about the Intentions and capa-
bilities of the other, if neither side is misleading. If any
understandings are reached, they may remain unwritten and be
Implemented in an agreed sequence of steps. On the other hand,
the process may be formal with written memorandums of dis-
cussions and agreements in writing. The exchange also may be
by means of formal written instruments such as notes, notes-
verbale, etc., committing each party to the document it has
transmitted.10 1 The verbal discussions or written communica-
tions can be kept away from the knowledge of the public or the
elites of third party states.
Conference: :A conference represents a pattern of in-
teraction in which the representatives of more than two groups
engage in direct, interpersonal communication to reach an
agreement or understanding on issues of common concern. 10 2
The Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Congress of Paris in 1856,
and the Congress of Berlin in 1878, along with the Conference
of Berlin in 1884-85, are typical of the conferences In the
last century.10 3 These conferences met by formal Invitations
99. For the important features of traditional bilateral
diplomacy, see Nicolson, p note 2, at 112.
100. See D. Heatley, Diplomacy and the Study of Inter-
national Relations 39 (119). An officious conversation Is a
free exchange of opinions which compromises neither party. Id.
101. For the different forms of written communication,
see the section on Techniques, see TAN 160-162.
102. This definition differs from that in J. Kaufmann,
Conference Diplomacy 23 (1968). There It is defined as diplo-
macy at an international conference or in an organ of an in-
ternational organization, consisting of the interaction among
the delegates, the secretariat and its chief executive, and
the presiding officer, in and outside the conference hall.
103. At present the expressions "Congress" and "Con-
ference" do not possess any significant difference in meaning.
For the different meanings given to them in the last century,
see E. Satow, 2 A Guide to Diplomatic Practice 11 (2d ed.
1922). See also F. Dunn, The Practice and Procedure of Inter-
national CnferenZes 15 (1929).
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extended by the local sovereigns, who provided all the facili-
ties for the conference. Conferences became more frequent dur-
ing and after World War 1.104 A new development of this cen-
tury is the practice of meeting under the auspices of some in-
ternational organization which provides all the secretarial
facilities for the conference.
A conference arena appears more suitable than the bi-
lateral one, or a series of bilateral ones, when a large num-
ber of groups are interested in a particular matter and es-
pecially when several issues are to be discussed. However, as
the number of participants increases, discussions can become
unmanageable or unproductive because the participants tend to
reiterate the positions they have taken earlier. The meetings
of the conference in plenary session are then reduced in num-
ber, and most of the communication exchanges take place out-
side the conference hall on a bilateral basis or in small
groups. For example, the Congress of Vienna, for the most
part, was a conference among the Big Four (Britain, Russia,
Prussia, and Austria), and later the Big Five (with France
added). Another advantage (or disadvantage) in a conference
is that each participant comes under the persuasions of other
members, and If the participants are a homogeneous group, a
participant with a different perspective may find himself iso-
lated in the conference.
An important feature of conferences in the last century
was that they were closed discussions, not open to the press
or the public. The proceedings were conducted in accordance
with agreed rules and were recorded in a summarized form. The
written record was first called protocol and later roces
verbal. 10 5 The record was consigned to the foreignoff es
and remained unpublished until it lost contemporary political
value. The first occasion when the press was admitted to a
conference was the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907.106
Even now, conferences may not be open to the press and the
public, but participants will usually give briefings to the
press.
Traditionalists in diplomacy consider open conference
proceedings to be a serious obstacle to reaching agreements,
since the positions which the participants take in the open
forum are publicized, and are difficult to change because of
prestige that has been committed or the pressure of public
104. See Lord Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 1(1946). -
105. See Dunn, supra note 103, at 216.
106. Kertesz, supra note 60, at 26. Admission was
only to the plenary meetings.
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opinion. 10 7 On the other hand, the participants in an open
forum can be sufficiently careful to safeguard the maneuver-
ability of their positions. Further, a conference requires
favorable public opinion to succeed, and in an unsympathetic
climate a conference suffers from depression and pessimism.10
In addition, the propaganda value of speeches in an open con-
ference forum is not very high.1 09
Conferences have varied outcomes. They may only en-
lighten others about the expectations of the participants with
no specific agreements. There may be only an agreement to
continue discussions in the future or at the level of offi-
cials in a lower hierarchy. On the other hand, conferences
may reach informal understandings to take concerted measures,
or they may formally agree in writing on common objectives and
means of implementation. The instruments agreed upon may be
recommendatory or prescriptive; in the latter case, they may,
or may not be subject to the formality of ratification. 10 As
a matter of general practice, as soon as the initial statements
of the different participants disclose an adequate basis for
agreement, initiatives are taken to prepare proposals in writ-
ten form and focus discussions on written drafts.
(ii) Parliamentary Diplomatic: The parliamentary
diplomatic arena possesses some features of national democratic
parliaments. Important among the features of the latter are
that (1) the comprehensiveness of their concerns go beyond the
individual subjects under discussion, (2) the permanence of
parliaments allow for a continuing debate on issues, (3) the
openness of the deliberations affect and Is affected by public
opinion, (4) the conduct of the deliberations is in accordance
with procedural rules which are administered by a presiding
officer and the parliament as a collective body and which fur-
nish an opportunity for tactical manipulation, (5) the conclu-
sion of the deliberations is by a simple or sometimes a special
majority vote, and (6) conclusions are advanced and highly
definitive steps in the process of policy prescription. 1 11
107. See the opinion of Sir Austen Chamberlain referred
to in Mowat, supra note 37, at 72.
108. Id., at 73.
* 109. See I. Claude, The Impact of Public Opinion upon
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 13 (1965).
110. For a more detailed statement of the different ob-
jectives, and, by implication, possible outcomes of confer-
ences, see Kaufmann, supra note 102, at 25.
Ill. For the definition of "parliamentary diplomacy"
given by Dean Rusk, who originated the expression, see "Par-
liamentary Diplomacy: Debate v. Negotiations," 26 World Aff.
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The parliamentary diplomatic arena stands midway be-
tween the classical diplomatic arena and the parliamentary
arena. It possesses some features of both. The interactions
are parliamentary in form, but the outcomes resemble those of
interactions in the classical diplomatic arena. The legisla-
tive bodies of international organizations, for example, are
arenas of parliamentary diplomatic character. Many of them
possess the first five features of a national parliament, and
the sixth feature appears when a competent body, such as the
U.N. General Assembly, approves its rules of procedure, staff
regulations, budget, etc., since it has the power to adopt
definitive resolutions on these matters. Conferences, such
as the current conference on the law of the sea, also present
an arena of the parliamentary diplomatic type. But some in-
ternational bodies, such as the NATO Council, do not have
open debate and voting, and conclusions are reached by consen-
sus, and as a result, they are not in the parliamentary diplo-
matic category.
While open debates are important features of national
democratic parliaments, the work of members of parliaments
also Includes lobbying and bargaining outside the chamber of
parliament. The work of international organs similarly in-
volves much bilateral and small group discussion. In fact,
the current trend Is by .procedural rules to provide oppor-
tunity for negotiation and bargaining in small groups outside
the formal meetings, to arrive at agreed solutions to be pre-
sented to the assembly. 11 2
It will appear that a parliamentary diplomatic arena
strengthens support for one's own position, through open de-
bate and otherwise. Each participant in the arena also seeks
to manipulate the rules of procedure and voting, to favor an
Interpreter 121 (1955). He refers to the first five of the
features mentioned here.
112. See Schachter, "Conciliation Procedure in the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," in
P. Sanders, ed., International Arbitration 268 (1967);
Krishnamurti & Cordoves, "Conciliation Procedures in the
UNCTAD," 2 J. of World Trade 445 (1968). In relation to the
Law of the Sea Conference, see Sohn, "Voting Procedure in the
United Nations Conferences for the Codification of Interna-
tional Law," 69 Am.J.Int'l L. 310, 333 (1975). In referen'e to
the Council of the E.E.C., see the "Luxemburg Agreement" under
which France in 1966 obtained the concession that when im-
poriant interests affecting France were at stake, discussion
would be continued until there was unanimous agreement.
Mathijsen, supra note 51, at 134.
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eventual prescription of a policy preferred by him (such as
recommendation, adoption, or authentication of the text of a
written agreement, or an expression of a general consensus) or
the implementation of a prescription itself. The aim will
also be to obtain outcomes that mark a rejection of the policy
favored by one's adversary. Continual interaction enables
each participant to be better informed about the changing ex-
pectations of other participants. In addition, the officials
of the institutions' secretariat get an opportunity to parti-
cipate in the interactions by supplying intelligence and ap-
praisals, by assisting in the drafting of resolutions, and by
advising the presiding officer on matters relating to the con-
duct of the proceedings.
(iii) Parliamentary: It is difficult to distinguish
a parliamentary arena from a parliamentary diplomatic arena,
though clear examples of the former are the U.N. Security Coun-
cil exercising its peace enforcing authority, the Assembly of
the E.E.C. when it votes to censure the Commission, and the
E.E.C. Council acting over a wide range of authority to make
definitive decisions.11 3 The effect of the resolutions of
many international organs is too complex a subject to admit
a simple statement. Though the resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly are formally called "recommendatory," they carry
high expectations of prescriptive outcomes. All patterns of
interaction in the parliamentary form, reached through resolu-
tions which carry high expectations of prescriptive outcomes,
are referred to here as belonging to the parliamentary cate-
gory.
(iv) Adjudicative: The expression "adjudicative" is
used here In a wider sense than just arbitration and judicial
settlement. The reference here Is to all cases wherein a
third party undertakes to help the settlement of a dispute be-
tween two groups. Lending "good offices" and undertaking
"mediation," "inquiry," or "conciliation" are placed alongside
arbitration and judicial settlement in this wider context.11 4
In the first four, third party influence is exercised to per-
113. See id. chap. 3.
114. I-tFe meanings generally given to these ex-
pressions, see M. Sirensenped., Manual of Public International
Law 675 (1968). When the third party exercises no or very
little influence on the parties to reach an agreement and sim-
ply acts as a medium of communication, the arena may have to
be categorized as classical diplomatic. Cf. the "go-between,
mediator, arbitrator and judge continuum," in M. Shapiro,
"Courts," in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds.,5 Handbook of
Political Science 321, 323, 349 (1975).
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suade or pressure the parties to reach a settlement. In "good
offices," "mediation" and "conciliation," the third party be-
comes, by and large, the medium of communication between the
parties and is able to manipulate the flow of communication
to attain the ends preferred by him. He is able to select
what information is to be communicated, when to be sent, and
In what sequence and verbal expression, to one or both the
parties. He also is in a position to introduce mediatory
values to satisfy the claims of either of the parties.115 In
"inquiry" the clarifications of issues of fact and law which
the third party furnishes necessarily affect the positions of
the contesting parties and of others interested in the settle-
ment of the dispute. 1 16
On the other hand, in arbitration and judicial settle-
ment the tribunal maintains communication with the contesting
parties and applies the judicial method to arrive at its ver-
dict. The initiation of arbitration is conditional upon the
parties reaching a compromis, or other appropriate agreement
of a general character providing for arbitration, and the suc-
cessful progress and completion of arbitration is conditional
largely upon the continuing cooperation of the parties with the
tribunal.T17 International judicial settlement requires an ex-
press or tacit consent for the Court's jurisdiction, and en-
forcing the verdicts is primarily related to diplomacy. 1 18 It
is to be noted, however, that the competence to give a defini-
tive verdict is not limited to arbitral tribunals and courts,
but it may be vested by the contesting parties in an organ of
an international organization or in an international official. 1 19
An adjudicative arena may be established in the unor-
ganized context of international relations or in the framework
of international organizations. A major development of this
century is the growth of the role of international organiza-
tions as intermediaries to help settle disputes. 12 0
115. On mediatory values, see F. Edmead, Analysis and
Prediction In International Mediation 16 (1971).
116. On "inquiry" see S6rensen, supra note 114, at 681.
117. Id., at 696.
118. See S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of Interna-
tional Court, chaps. I and 4 (1965).
119. Ej., in 1963, Malaysia, the Philippines and In-
donesia entrusted the determination of the wishes of the peo-
ple of North Borneo and Sarawak, on the basis of the recently
held election results, to the Secretary-General U Thant. See
Rovihe, supra note 55, at 378.
120. See S6rensen, supra note 114, chap. 11, H 2 & 5.
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(v) Executive: The decentralized pattern of the cur-
rent world community organization leaves the application of
prescriptions primarily to the officials of nation-states, and
much bilateral diplomacy is directed to influence such imple-
mentation. With the rise of international organizations, in-
ternational authorities have been vested with certain execu-
tive functions. The Commission of the E.E.C. and the U.N.
Secretary-General are prominent examples. The exercise of
executive functions entails communication between such offi-
cials and the officials of nation-states and of other IGOs and
NGOs organizations. The latter supply intelligence and ap-
praisals, make recommendations, or invoke prescriptions.
(b) Structures of Authority
The structure of authority in the diplomatic arena is
primarily coarchic, rather than hierarchic. Representati'ves
of nation-states stand on equal footing since nation-states
interact with each other according to the formal principle of
sovereign equality. However, at meetings of nation-states,
deference will be shown to an official of higher rank, and he
will be allowed to preside. 12 1 As against representatives of
non-official groups and of unrecognized nation-states or gov-
ernments, the officials of nation-states claim a higher author-
ity, which will be readily conceded by the first group, but de-
nied by the second.
Within the framework of International organizations, a
modicum of hierarchy appears in some contexts. In relation to
the members of an organization acting collectively, the offi-
cials of the organization are in a subordinate position, though
in reference to any single member such subordination does not
exist. The officials of the E.E.C. In certain areas, however,
stand on a slightly higher level with respect to the officials
of the member states. In other organizations, as well, where
the organs have competence to receive complaints from a member
against another for non-observance of its obligations towards
the organization, the officials of the allegedly delinquent
member stand in a lower position of authority in relation to
the other members of the organ, collectively. The officials
of an IGO are in a position of higher authority with respect
to representatives of NGOs and IGO officials are equal with
officials from other IGOs.
When the organ of an international organization under-
121. E.., President Franklin Roosevelt, as the rank-
ing head of state, presided over the Tehran Conference in
1943, and President Wilson presided over the Paris Peace Con-
ference in 1919.
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takes a task of good offices, mediation, or conciliation, that
collective body or anyone nominated by it has somewhat more
authority than the contestants. However, in the performance
of its task, the mediator will make every effort to convey an
impression that it wishes only to help the parties solve their
problem, rather than to impose Its own solution. Where media-
tion is undertaken outside the framework of an international
organization expressly vested with authority to deal with dis-
putes, the mediator does not possess any higher authority.
(I) Spatial or Geographical Features: The spatial
or geographical factor may connect the interacting groups in
some manner, such as being immediate neighbors or belonging to
a region. In these days of electronic communication and jet
travel, distance may not prevent the establishment of con-
tacts with the elites in a geographically distant region, but
proximity does contribute to increased diplomatic interaction.
It develops interdependence, and creates a favorable atmosphere
for collaborative arrangements. On the other hand, being a
neighbor may generate over a period of time conflicts of in-
terests and disharmony. In addition, it is easier for an elite
to contact the counter-elite in a neighboring nation-state, and
when such contact is made, the relations between the two elites
are bound to be strained. But an offer of good offices or
mediation in a dispute between two neighbors, coming from.a
third neighbor, may appear more natural and appropriate. 122
Nation-states located in the same area of the world are
likely to perceive common Interests, and sustained diplomatic
interactions may develop on a regional basis. The Organiza-
tion of American States, the European Economic Community, the
Council of Europe, the Organization of African Unity, high-
light the development of diplomatic ties on a regional basis.
But even if there is no formal organization, the offer of good
offices or mediation coming from a nation-state in the same
region as the disputing parties may appear normal. On the
other hand, a diplomatic overture by the officials of a nation-
state to the officials of a distant state, which is regarded
by a third state as located in a region in which it is in-
terested, may affect the expectations of the latter two. The
United States, for example, in the 1920s resented the initia-
tive of Sir Eric Drummond, then Secretary-General of the League
of Nations, to bring about a negotiated settlement of disputes
between Latin American states.N3 This was apparently due to
122. For an explanation of "salience," see Young, The
Intbrmediaries, supra note 21, at 83.
123. See Rovine, supra note 55, at 65-73.
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these states being considered under the Monroe Doctrine, while
the League was thought to be a European organization.
The interaction may be "plurilateral"--that is to say,
between elites of groups connected with each other by a factor
other than geography. The Commonwealth is a good example of
an institution furnishing a plurilateral arena. An arena of
this type may be established for attaining a comprehensive set
of objectives, as the Commonwealth, or a particular objective,
as the OPEC was created for maintaining oil prices at a level
favorable to the member countries. Many of the general in-
ternational organizations now in existence were formed with
little reference to the geographical element. An arena also
may be universal. For example, all significant groups on the
world stage today may be said to be connected by some means
of diplomatic communication, though the ties may be tenuous.
(ii) Temporal Feature (Duration): The movement in
the history of diplomacy, from one point of view, has been
from occasional encounters to continuous interaction. Ad hoc
embassies preceded resident diplomatic missions, and confer-
ences of an ad hoc character, attended by heads of state or
government or other representatives, preceded modern interna-
tional organizations providing continuing arenas. Ad hoc
"Summit" meetings of heads of state or government are even now
used when it is thought that they would reduce the complexity
of the problems.
The duration of interaction affects the expectations of
the parties and may influence outcomes. A diplomatic mission
recently opened may not be able to play as significant a role
as a long established one. The interaction between the members
of an international'organization within its framework would, In
due course, produce dispositions on the part of the members of
fairly stable character towards issues. Consider, for in-
stance, the attitude that developed in the United Nations with
respect to colonialism, in spite of the fact that the provi-
sions of the Charter did not specify the goal of independence
for colonial possessions. Parties engaged in diplomatic nego-
tiations for a short time may find it easy to break them off,
unlike those who have been negotiating for a long time. When
negotiations proceed for a considerable time, each party is
likely to develop a predisposition to make them a success due
to mutual disclosures of information that have occurred, or
because of the disappearance in the interim of alternatives
originally available, or for the reason that the parties have
developed a norm for themselves to negotiate in good faith
which was initially absent.124 In addition, when negotiations
124. See M. Eisenberg, "Private Ordering through Nego-
tiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking," 89 Harv. L. R.
637, 679 (1976).
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in progress for a long time are broken off, the disappointment
on the part of those desiring their continuance will be deeper
than when recently commenced negotiations are terminated. But
it may be true that in some instances the protraction of nego-
tiations is due to an impasse, and the parties and outsiders
may be psychologically prepared for their unfruitful termina-
tion.
(iii) Crisis: A crisis situation is one which cre-
ates for some or all the participants expectations of severe
deprivation of their key values, from large scale violence or
other circumstances. Events appear to flow in an intense,
rapid fashion and are on the verge of going out of control.125
Diplomatic interactions take place in situations of varied
levels of crisis, from the lowest to the most intense. Crises
inhibit the process of communication among the elites, since
the elites become engaged in planning their own strategies to
meet the opponent's challenge, and they make special effort to
conceal their plans. Yet crises have a built-in protective
mechanism: the fear of the likely catastrophe will activate
mediatory efforts on the part of third parties, or the parties
themselves will endeavor to escape from the dangerous situ-
ation. These safety mechanisms, however, may not be adequate
to contain the situation. Nevertheless, the elites with pro-
grams of expansion find sufficient incentive to create a
crisis with the hope of gaining a diplomatic success.
126
2. Access to the Arenas
Two questions arise with respect to access: (a) Is it
free or restricted? (b) Is it voluntary or compulsory?
In the context of unorganized relations among nation-
states, access is not free. Nation-states differentiate be-
tween nation-states headed by recognized governments and those
headed by unrecognized governments. Only recognized govern-
ments are permitted to establish diplomatic missions which
facilitate free access to a high degree in the bilateral arena.
Unrecognized governments are permitted to establish only such
missions and posts as the unrecognizing government chooses to
allow. Hence, unrecognized governments have fewer facilities
for diplomatic interaction than the recognized ones. These
125. On the characteristics of a crisis, see McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 7, at 284; Young sura note 9,
at 6.
126. Sir Harold Nicolson mentions that the creation
of a crisis situation was one of the features of the tradi-
tional Italian diplomatic style. Nicolson, supra note 2, at
152.
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facilities may range from none to a situation which is almost
equivalent to the facilities accorded to the recognized ones. 12 7
Normal exchange of diplomatic missions and consular posts is
one of the advantages which cause new governments and nation-
states to seek recognition from other nation-states. However,
even after recognition, a nation-state may refuse to exchange
diplomatic missions or consular posts, if it finds that such a
course is to its advantage. Furthermore, frequently recogni-
tion is accorded or refused less in compliance with the sup-
posedly legal criteria and more as a result of an explicit or
tacit bargain. Access to conferences also is restricted by in-
vitation.
Access to the organized arenas is contingent upon the
participant fulfilling the conditions prescribed by those that
have established and are maintaining the arenas. Admission to
the membership of an international organization is necessarily
governed by the relevant provisions of the instrument of-the
organization. These rules are amenable to manipulation by
those who are already members, so as to grant or deny ad-
mission to those seeking it. Establishment of observer missions
by non-members, liaison offices by other IGOs, and consultative
status for NGOs, is again subject to the constituent Instrument
and other rules of the organization.
Access to the arenas is not as voluntary as It appears
to be. Though it is theoretically possible for an elite not
to seek recognition, not to exchange diplomatic missions or
consular posts, and not to become a member of any internation-
al organization, it is doubtful whether any nation-state or
group would seek such isolation. Such an isolation cuts It
off from the world social process and the constitutive process
of authoritative decision. It is doubtful whether other nation-
states would allow it to dwell in complete isolation from these
processes. A statement nearer the truth is that a nation-state
is generally free either to enter or not to enter a particular
arena. The optional character of the entry is reflected in
the statement of the Permanent Court of International Justice
in its advisory opinion In Eastern Carelia: git is well es-
tablished in international law that no State can, without its
consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States
either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any kind of pa-
cific settlement."12 8 On the other hand, treaties and member-
ship of international organizations may make the entry obliga-
127. See e.g., the position of the missions exchanged
between France and North Vietnam since 1954. B. R. Bot, Non-
recognition and Treaty Relations 94 (1968).
128. P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 27 (1923).
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tory under specified circumstances.12 9 A member of the U.N.,
for instance, can bring a complaint before the Security Coun-
cil or General Assembly against another member. The latter
would find it difficult to prevent the consideration of the
complaint and it would be able to do so only by convincing
a majority of the organization that the body lacked competence.
When the issue is brought before the organization, however, its
members may assume mediatory roles.
D. Base Values: Relative Capabilities at Diplomatic
Strategy
Generally, the capability of the participants to oper-
ate the diplomatic strategy is determined by the human values
which are at the disposal of each participant. Every value is
useful in some measure to influence the other participants.
Focusing attention, however, on the essential elements of the
diplomatic instrument, the factors that affect its capability
are: (1) the formal authority which gives access to the arenas
of Interaction and to the institutions that facilitate the
gathering of intelligence and the transmission of guidance;
(2), the facilities for communication, which include the per-
sonnel, as well as the organizational skills, that are aval.l-
able to gather and analyse intelligence and to plan and imple-
ment the strategy; and (3) all other human values, material and
non-material, which can be used to influence the other party.
1. Formal Authority
When access to the arenas Is obtained by the relevant
formal processes, it is simple to initiate interaction. Recog-
nition facilitates interaction with the officials of the recog-
nizing government, and admission to an international organiza-
tion makes it easy to communicate with the members--in some de-
gree even with those that have not accorded recognition--and
with the officials of the organization. In the absence of
recognition or admission to membership, interaction will be
difficult, if not- impossible. Access to the arenas, moreover,
accompanied by the establishment of organized institutions,
such as permanent missions and consulates, bring into opera-
tion prescriptions which accord these missions or posts and
their officials privileges and immunities that are useful for
obta.ining Intelligence and guidance. Even secret agents use
these privileges for gathering, processing and transmitting
129. See Sdrensen, supra note 11, ch. 11, § 2 & 5.
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intelligence, as long as they are not caught obviously engaged
in espionage. 130
The existence of a large number of diplomatic missions
and consular posts in a nation-state, moreover, is in itself
an additional facility for the gathering of intelligence since
the officials of friendly nation-states can exchange informa-
tion they have acquired. The same applies to permanent and ob-
server missions. Even the officials of a nation-state who do
not like the policies of their home authorities may pass on In-
formation with the hope that their state will be forced to
change its programs. 13 1
2. Communication Facilities
(a) Intelligence
The sources of intelligence of a group vary. First, a
nation-state's own officials gather intelligence from public
sources, as well as through secret agents who specialize in
collecting information withheld from circulation by the other
elites. The press and other media, along with individuals
who move across nation-state boundaries, also supply intelli-
gence.
The sources of intelligence of international officials
consist in some measure of information transmitted to them by
the field missions of their organizations since the organiza-
tions cannot, for obvious reasons, maintain secret agencies.
But the most important source is the information supplied vol-
untarily or on request by the officials of other organizations
and member-states, as well as publications of government and
private agencies. Officials of non-member states and other
groups may also be sources of information when the interna-
tional officials are permitted to contact them.
Officials of nation-states are the best situated group
for intelligence gathering. But their capacity is dependent
upon the resources and organizational machinery available for
this purpose. Besides official agencies, non-officials play
a great role in nation-states where the press and other media
of public information are not brought under state monopoly.
Officials of friendly nation-states generally supply some in-
130. See Thae, supra note 41, at 176 et seq.; Bohlen,
supra note 83, at"3W.-
131. Hans Hewarth, a Second Secretary in the German Em-
bassy in Moscow during the 1930's, opposed Nazi policies and
passed on information to the American Embassy, apparently, with
the hope that it would enable the U.S. to delay the Nazi treaty
with the U.S.S.R. Id. at 29.
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formation, and non-officials might supply information volun-
tarily. The intelligence of non-official groups is derived
from primary research and from published materials.
Intelligence to be useful must be accurate and rele-
vant to the objectives of the strategy, and it must be trans-
mitted promptly to the centers of analysis and planning. In-
accurate information misleads the planners. Diplomats sending
home unrealistic reports just to please the higher officials
at homel3 2 or to defend the policies of the officials of the
nation-state to which they are accredited abuse the strategy. 1 33
Irrelevant information overloads the channels of transmission
and overburdens analysts and planners. 134 However, since those
gathering intelligence do not know the precise objectives of
the strategists at home, and what information will be useful
at the time of transmission, it Is difficult for the diplomats
to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant. In-
telligence should reach the centers of analysis and planning
before events render it useless.
(b) Analysis and Planning
The promptness and efficiency with which analysts and*
planners process intelligence, formulate available alternatives,
and bring them to the attention of the decision-makers are im-
portant factors. The quality of the personnel and the or-
ganizational structure In which they work are also relevant.
Nation-states which have foreign offices furnished with a rich
store of information, quick retrieval facilities, competent
personnel that can realistically interpret the available data,
and a system that can promptly transmit relevant facts and al-
ternatives to policy-makers are likely to fare much better than
those nation-states that are deficient In these areas. 13 5
132. See Thayer, supra note 41, at 163.
133. See Bourbon-Busset, rnote 22, at 88-89; see
also Craig &Gilbert, supra note2,-4-at chap. 17 (description
of-'w two British ambasdors, Nevile Henderson and the Earl
of Perth, made the mistake of advocating the policies favored
by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy).
134. See note 42 supra. The problem of overreporting
and the reporting of useless information goes back to 15th
century Italy. See Mattingly, supra note 31, at 96.
135. The problem of coordination of policy by the var-
ious departments at the national level In relation to the U.N.
received the attention of the U.N. General Assembly, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and the UNESCO as early as 1947. Some
studies were made but no specific action was taken. See
J. Hadwen & J. Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions Are Made
33 (1961).
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Diplomats are frequently frustrated by the fact that their
messages move slowly In the organizational web at the lower
echelons in the foreign offices. The guidance they expect,
moreover, may not come quickly enough. 36  It is also possi-
ble that decision-makers will fall prey to the human frailty
of overlooking reports that are unpalatable.137
(c) Policy Decisions
Policy decisions should be made on the basis of the in-
formation at hand, as promptly as the situation requires. It
necessarily takes time for the organs of international or-
ganizations to meet, deliberate, make their decision, and trans-
mit it to the appropriate officials. All modern nation-states,
except those under the direction of a single person, also take
time to decide. In a pluralist democracy, decision-making is
shared by at least the top leaders having constitutional'au-
thority, and pressures for wider sharing are often Intense.13 8
Even in a communist nation-state, the pressures of the party
leadership for participation in decision-making cannot be Ig-
nored.1 39 When a single leader decides policy issues, more-
136. See the findings of the Jackson sub-committee In
this regard. H. Jackson, supra note 26, at 51. Due to the
hierarchy in the foreign office, instructions sometimes "are
out of date, irrelevant and unconstructive." A. Lal., Modern
International Negotiation 322 (1966). in any organization tTe
hierarchy also operates as an information filter upwards. The
result is that the information reaching the top executive is
subject to distortion, even to the point of creating a false
Image. This indicates the usefulness of personal contacts
among top officials. See Boulding, supra note 13, at 148.
137. This is what happened in Nazi Germany after
Ribbentrop took over as Foreign Minister. See Craig & Gilbert,
supra note 24, at 435. It also affected French diplomacy be-
fore World War II. Id. at 388.
138. See gen-rally, Bourbon-Busset, supra note 22; see
also, Jackson, supra note 26, at viii; Brookings Institution
Foreign Policy Study at 27.
139. Bourbon-Busset, supra note 22, at 80; see also
Churchill, supra note 24; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Bk.2,
chap. 5; Triumph and Tragedy 205; Arthur Lall notes that, after
the liberalization In the 1950's,even non-official groups such as
the Writers' Association and the Academy of Sciences have been
able to exercise some influence. Lall_, supra note 136, at
chap. 19.
[VOL. 3
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN PERSPECTIVE
over, there will be little opportunity for correcting errors,
and diplomacy may take a disastrous course. But to the ex-
tent the decision-making is shared, secrecy cannot be main-
tained, and as Richelieu remarked, anything worthy of being
called a grand design must be conceived in secrecy.1 4o
Facilities for transmitting instructions quickly to
those who implement the policy decisions are highly important.
Delayed or ambiguous instructions serve little purpose.
(d) Implementation
Implementation of policy decisions involves in a large
part exchange of communication with the other elites, and here
the personal skills of diplomats who engage in communication
exchange are important for the success of the strategy. Ever
since the practice of sending emissaries on diplomatic missions
started, the personal skill required of a diplomat has been a
much discussed topic. Well known publicists on this subject
in the Western world are Bernard du Rosier, Ermolao Barbaro,
Machiavelli, De Vera, Wiquefort, Callieres, Andrew D. White,
Jules Jusserand, Jules Cambon, and Harold Nicolson. A percep-
tive scholar observes in reference to all these writings: 14 1
One is often Impressed in reading Ermolao
Barbaro with the timeless quality of what
he says about the practice of the diplo-
mat's profession. Much of it has already
been said . . . and'would be said again
. by . . . literary diplomats down to
the present. The intonation varies with
the individual and his environment, but
the essential substance remains unchanged.
No matter with what air of discovery or
paradox it is paraded, or with what per-
sonal experiences illustrated, it boils
down to the same scanty residue of what
seems like the tritest platitudes. So do
the simple and difficult rules of any en-
during human art.
Whether it is truthfulness and good faith that are emphasized
or craftiness, deception, and opportunism, the basic skill is
the adaptation of communication techniques and-tactics of per-
suasion, bargaining, and coercion to the goals set by the de-
cision-makers. 142 The skill also includes the acquisition of
140. Bourbon-Busset, s note 22, at 83.
141. Mattingly, supra note 31, at 100.
142. For an historical illustration of the exercise of
skill in this regard, reference may be made to the role of Talley-
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realistic and useful feedback which is to be transmitted to
the decision-makers for obtaining further instructions on pol-
icy matters.
Interpersonal conversations are generally expected to be
conducted with precision in expression, without yielding any
more ground than was decided upon previously by the home au-
thorities and without displaying needless abrasiveness that de-
velops hostility. Diplomats are generally considered to be
specialists in the art of communicating unpleasant messages to
the adversary in palliative euphemisms. It is also expected
that important conversations will be reduced to writing.
Claims are formally presented in written form, and most agree-
ments are in writing. Hence, the ability to draft written In-
struments and to understand the implications of the written
word are indispensable skills for participants in all arenas. 143
Participants in the parliamentary diplomatic arena, how-
ever, require additional skills. They should possess the abil-
ity to debate and to manipulate the rules of procedure for ob-
taining favorable outcomes and preventing unfavorable ones.
Skills at giving instant reply to the charges levied by the
*adversary and at exploiting the opportunities which the adver-
sary provides, unwittingly or unwisely, for propaganda against
him are needed.1 44
For participation in the adjudicative arena, a spe-
cialized skill is also needed. To be a successful intermediary,
the participant should be acceptable to the contesting parties.
They should perceive him to be impartial, I.e., Indifferent to
the gains or losses of either party.1 45 Acice'ptabillty should
be present at the outset of the intermediary mission and con-
tinue throughout the process, or else the mission may fail.
For that reason, the intermediary should be capable of appear-
ing as a catalyst in the process of a reement rather than as a
dictator of the terms of settlement. 196 In addition, the abil-
rand at the Congress of Vienna. See R. Nicolson, The Congress of
Vienna 140 (1946).
143. Nicolson remarked that "diplomacy . . . is a writ-
ten rather than a verbal art . . ."; Nicolson, supra note 2,
at 113. See also Mowat, supra note 37, at 258, who considers
both to be equally important.
144. See in this connection, P. Jessup, "Parliamentary
Diplomacy," Hague Recueil 1956-1, at 185, 236; Kaufmann, supra
note 102, at 138 et qM.; Hadwen & Kaufmann, supra note 135,
at 28 et seq.
15. For a discussion of the "impartiality" of an In-
termediary, see Young, The Intermediaries, supr note 21, at 81.
146. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 2. Leon Gordenker,
in his essay, "The Secretary-General," in J. Barros ed., The
United Nations, Past, Present and Future 135 (1972,remarked
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ity to take the initiative when needed and to time the moves
properly is essential in this, as in all arenas.
3. Values Available for Deployment
An ability to give or withdraw resources that influ-
ence the policies of another nation-state, or even the ability
to destroy the values of the other party, is a useful asset
for diplomacy. Traditionally, it has been believed that diplo-
macy is better conducted when a nation-state is in possession
of military strength. King Frederick of Prussia often applied
the dictum that "diplomacy without arms is like a concert with-
out a score."l147 The diplomats of the previous centuries ap-
proached their task in the expectation that if they failed the
military would intervene. When a nation-state expects neither
rewards nor deprivations from another, the latter is without
leverage or power to influence the former, and when there is
no leverage, diplomacy can become a frustrating game. Winston
Churchill observed, for instance, that Allied diplomacy to win
over Mussolini did not succeed because they had nothing to of-
fer which Mussolini ould not acquire himself or which Hitler.
could not provide. 14 8  On the other hand, it must be noted that
a party capable of foregoing rewards and absorbing deprivations,
is likely to react adversely to any coercive measures. In-
addition, the power of a negotiator often depends .on his in-
ability to make full concessions to his opponent, l because
it could prevent the opponent from making some demands. But a
nation-state's strategic capability at diplomacy remains de-
pendent on its power to grant or withdraw resources.
The ability to make offers or threats, furthermore, is
conditioned by factors internal to the group on behalf of
which the strategists operate. Those who conduct diplomacy
function within their nation-state's socio-political systeml50
that Dag Hammarskjold "showed a broad talent for improvising
diplomatic formula that left no party better off but no party
perceptibly the loser."
147. Mattingly, supra note 31, at 134.
148. TeFall of France, at 108.
149. Schelling, s note 4, at 22.
150. See Galtung & Ruge, "Patterns of Diplomacy," 1965
J. of Peace Research 101.' They present the thesis that the
"felitist" approach to diplomacy should give way to the "struc-
turalist" approach. See also V. Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fet-
ters, chap. 2 (1944), -on the impact of democracy on the free-
o~m-of statesmen in operating diplomatic strategies.
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and the climate of public opinion. 15 1 Both set limits on what
can be granted as rewards or imposed as penalties. Similar
problems apply to international civil servants who function in
an environment of diverse political pressures generated by the
members of their particular organization.1 52
Resources are not only a power base but they also mean
wealth for the nation-state. The wealth components, however,
can be used for rewards to influence the outcome of diplomatic
interaction with a participant who finds utility in the com-
ponents offered. 153  Enlightenment, i.e., information not
available to the other party, also can be used as bargaining
assets to obtain other information. Skills in scientific and
technological fields have now become a transferable commodity
and can be brought to the negotiating table.15 4
Respect commanded by a nation-state, its ruling elite,
and its diplomats in the field is another important factor in
exercising influence, and the argument that a party will-suffer
a loss of respect if a particular act is done can be used by
either side.155 The special importance which international of-
ficials should attach to the respect value was stated by Dag
Hammarskjold:156
151. "The privacy of the diplomatic chamber Is an il-
lusion. Its walls are never totally sound-proofed against the
voicefof the people outside." Claude, supra note 109, at 3.
Churchill refers to more than one occasion when he told Stalin
that public opinion in England would not accept a proposal.
W. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Bk.2, chap. 3; The
Hinge of Fate, at 142. But the plea of public opin-on is also
one of the ways of opposing the adversary's demand.
152. Dag Hammarskjold thought that a Secretary-General
who loses the support of a permanent member of the Security
Council and two-thirds of the General Assembly could no longer
function in office. See Cordier & Foote, supra note 59, Vol.
V, at 495.
153. For a discussion of the British use of wealth re-
sources in diplomacy about the time of the Congress of Vienna,
see Nicolson, s note 142, at 57, 59. A nation-state whose
wealth resources are dependent upon collaborative arrangements
with others cannot afford to adopt rigid or isolationist posi-
tions. Lall, supra note 136, at 232.
137 7 Tl pr'actice of giving ambassadors up-to-date in-
formation to pass it on in exchange, if necessary, goes back to
the 15th century. See Mattingly, supra note 31, at 99.
155. For how-Talleyrand used a plea based upon respect
and fame against Emperor Alexander at the Congress of Vienna,
see Nicolson, supra note 142, at 177.
1567 Address before the international civil servants,
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"Countries are arming in order to be able
to negotiate from a position of strength.
The Secretariat too has to negotiate, not
only in its own interest, but for the cause
of peace and a peaceful development of the
world. The weight we carry is not deter-
mined by the physical force or the number of
people who form the constituency. It is
based solely on the trust in our impartial-
ity, our experience and knowledge, our matu-
rity of judgment. Those qualities are our
weapons, in no way secret weapons
It is out of consideration for the value of respect that liter-
ary diplomats, except those of Machiavelli's persuasion, have
argued against falsehood and deception, which would seriously
damage the respect of a nation-state if discovered. Further-
more, it is difficult for those who have a reputation for
bluffing at bargaining to communicate credible commitments to
any particular positions. 157
Cordiality among leaders provides room for mutual in-
fluencing, which indicates the importance of the affection
values.15B Diplomacy progresses more easily between friendly
nation-states.159 Shared values of rectitude, articulated in
common ideologies symbolizing aspirations for a better socio-
economic-political order, generally create a lower threshold
for cordial diplomatic interaction.
E. Techniques and Tactics
"Techniques" consist of the broad operations of man-
aging the base values available for attaining policy objectives,
and "tactics" involve the variation and adjustment of tech-
niques to suit the needs of the particular situation. In any
context, strategy involves the employment of more than one in-
strument of policy; rarely is the diplomatic instrument used
alone. But strategy does attach primary value to one instru-
Geneva (Dec. 4, 1953) reprinted in Cordier and Foote, supra
note 59, Vol. II, at 193.
157. On the value of bargaining reputation, see Ikle,
supra note 4, chap. 6.
158. President Roosevelt wrote to Prime Minister
Churchill that he could handle Stalin better than "either your
Foreign Office or my State Department . . . He (Litvinov)
thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do
so." W. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate 174.
159. Lall, supra note 136, at 82.
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ment over another. Negotiation may be conducted, for example,
to allow time for military preparations.1 60 A stiff diplomatic
posture may be used as a military bluff, or after making prep-
arations for using overwhelming military force, diplomatic
communication may be used only to transmit the demand for sur-
render, as Hitler did to Austria and Czechoslovakia. Negotia-
tions also may be undertaken merely to satisfy public opinion,
16 1
or to obtain information for propaganda. Cordial diplomatic
relations may be maintained to further good trade prospects.
On the other hand, the emphasis may be on diplomatic strategy
in withdrawing armed forces from a particular area on the eve
of a projected negotiating session or in extending economic in-
centives without any preconditions. The main focus in this
paper will be on situations where the diplomatic strategy is
the primary instrument, while the other instruments are auxil-
iary. 162
Diplomatic operations can be divided into three areas:
(1) maximizing the use of communication facilities for intelli-
gence and for the transmission of guidance to agents that en-
gage in communication exchange; (2) preparing for communica-
tion exchanges with other elites, which includes the selection
of long- and short-term objectives, the formulation of alterna-
tive means for attaining those goals, the choice of personnel
to engage in communication exchange, and the choice of the ap-
propriate arena for interaction and the venue for communica-
tion exchange; (3) shaping communication with other elites for
attaining the selected objectives.
1. Intelligence and Guidance
In implementing the diplomatic strategy, each partici-
pant aims at maximizing the range and efficiency of his com-
munication system. This is done by obtaining recognition, ex-
changing missions and consulates, and by supplementing them,
160. Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed to con-
tinue negotiation with the Japanese during World War ll, before
the Japanese entry into the war, on the impossible terms pro-
posed by Japan, to gain a moratorium of about 30 days to im-
prove the military position at Singapore. W. Churchill, The
Grand Alliance 371.
161. When the Paris meeting of the foreign ministers
of U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and France was broken off in 1951,
France was reluctant to terminate for fear of its impact upon
domestic elections. Bohlen, supra note 83, at 296.
162. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 7, at
404, make the distinction between primary and auxiliary strate-
gies.
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when necessary, with ad hoc missions. It also is useful to be-
come a member of as many international organizations as would
appear to furnish diplomatic opportunities, and where member-
ship is not possible, to obtain some of the facilities inci-
dental to membership by arranging, for instance, to have ob-
server status. Non-official groups would aim at obtaining con-
sultative status with international organizations.
These diplomatic institutions facilitate transmission
of both intelligence and guidance. The transmission of guid-
ance, however, may not be necessary if the top policy-makers
have a "hot line" to communicate directly, or if they nego-
tiate personally. But if guidance is transmitted, care must
be taken to insure its secrecy if the instructions are to be
useful in negotiations. International officials, however,
should communicate only through official facilities of trans-
mission. The maintenance of secrecy in relation to many mat-
ters is a universal practice among nation-states. Even inter-
national secretariats have secret archives, 1 63 and when en-
gaged in mediatory missions, international officials as well
should maintain secrecy, at least while the negotiations are
in progress.1 64 Information kept secret by one group may be
vital, not only to the diplomatic, but to the overall strategy
of some other group or groups. Hence, great effort is directed
to overcoming this secrecy. Communication codes are broken,
telephone wires are tapped, and electronic devices are
"planted" in diplomatic missions. 16 5 The missions, for their
part, use audiosurveillance devices to intercept the communi-
cations of the host government.1 6 6 All this has become more
163. See Rovine, supra note 55, at 11.
164. See Dag Hammarskjold's address at Ohio University
(Feb. 5, 19587reprinted in Cordier & Foote, supra note 59,
at 28, 29.
165. See C. Wilson, Cold War Diplomacy 19 (1966).
Count Ciano of Italy in the 1930's had the mail of foreign em-
bassies read on a regular basis. See Craig & Gilbert, supra
note 24, at 523. Before 1929, some assistants in the U.S.
State Department practised code-cracking to decipher messages
to and from foreign embassies, until Secretary of State Stim-
son ordered the practice be stopped. See Thayer, supra note
41, at 143. But code-cracking is now a common operation for
secret services. See id., chap. 12.
166. It isrepoFted that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and
the Soviet Embassy in Washington have installed devices to in-
tercept telephone and radio messages of the host governments.
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1976, at 1, col. I.
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or less a routine activity.167
Host governments may also impede the gathering and trans-
mission of intelligence by diplomatic missions by such devices
as not permitting the personnel to move freely outside the
missions and by stopping the transmission of messages on some
pretext.168 The local people may be prevented from contactlng
the personnel of the missions, or they may be incited against
them. The most extreme measure is to order the closing of the
mission or post.
Restrictive measures, however, against diplomatic Mis-
sions provoke retaliations and, consequently, a reduction in
the flow of intelligence to those who apply restrictions.
Therefore, the advantages of restrictive measures have to be
weighed against their costs. Management of the inflow and out-
flow of intelligence is indeed a highly delicate operation.
Even in military and economic strategies, it is occasionally
necessary to have the opponent receive some intelligence so
that he will refrain from certain types of activity harmful to
the strategists' side. Furthermore, in diplomatic, ideological,
and economic strategies, the opponent must be fed with intelli-
gence that will create expectations of a favorable payoff.169
Otherwise, he will keep himself out of the game, which will be
self-defeating to the strategists. Similarly, interference
with the transmission of guidance may be self-defeating.
2. Preparation
(a) Clarification of Objectives
The first step in the preparation for diplomatic inter-
action is to determine the objectives of interaction and the
priorities among them. Since a favorable outcome of diplo-
matic interaction is largely dependent upon the bther party's
167. The present practice is in contrast to what oc-
curred in the last century. E.g., in 1893, the French Govern-
ment recalled nearly all the staff of its Legation at Copen-
hagen because the French military attache had sought, through
an intermediary, to obtain secret information about Anglo-
Russian relations. Mowat, supra note 37, at 54.
168. During the 1956 uprising, Hungary stopped the
transmission of messages from the U.S. diplomatic mission for
over 24 hours. Wilson, supra note 165, at 24.
169. See Schelling, supra note 4, at 176. He states,
"In these games(non-zero-sum) one is often more concerned
with making the other player anticipate one's mode of play, and
anticipate it correctly, than disguising one's strategy."
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assent or acquiescence to the proposed program, the policy-
makers of the group should determine what programs are fea-
sible. Negotiations initiated without clear objectives are
likely to drift into undesired courses. 170
(b) Formulating the alternatives to attain the
objectives
Those who operate the strategy should work out before-
hand, or should be able to develop according to the demands
of the situation, the various alternatives available to attain
the objectives. If an alternative fails, or is unacceptable
to the other party, the immediate availability of another al-
ternative would be a great advantage. When a participant is
playing the role of a mediator, it is highly important for
the success of his mission that he be able to present varied
alternatives for the consideration of the parties in dispute.171
In a conference or parliamentary diplomatic arena, the presi-
dent can play a major role in the success of the conference
by his ingenuity in devising alternative bases of accommoda-
tion between the different protagonists. The international
officials assisting him can be highly helpful by anticipating
and preparing for the different conflicting situations. 72
It is a matter of common knowledge that foreign offices pre-
pare one or more draft treaties or proposals in preparation
for expected negotiations, or interactions in conference or
parliamentary diplomatic arenas.
(c) Choice of personnel
The choice of the personnel is usually related to the
arena chosen for interaction. But in respect of each arena
there is indeed more than one option.
For the bilateral arena, officials in the foreign of-
fice or the diplomatic missions are usually closer. They are
170. Harold Nicolson, after reviewing the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919, concludes that its disastrous results were
due to the absence of precision in the goals of the leading
participants. See H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, 208 (1939);
see also H. Nicoson', Diplomacy, supanote 2, at 112.
171. E. Jackson, supra note 4, at 108. He states that
one of the reasons for the success of Dr. Ralph Bunche in
Palestine mediation was his ability to put forward a stream of
proposals.
172. Lall, supra note 136, at 248, speaks highly about
the role of Malcolm MacDonald as a co-chairman at the Geneva
Conference on Laos in 1961-62.
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assumed to possess knowledge about transnational political and
other interactions, and negotiating or bargaining skills. The
person selected, however, should have a status that is appro-
priate to the degree of importance of the matter to be dis-
cussed, 173 and be acceptable to the other negotiating party.
The general practice of appointing persons in the foreign or.
diplomatic service is departed from in three cases: First,
since travel has become quicker and less arduous, there has
been a tendency for the foreign minister himself to take up
the negotiating task. This so-called 'personal diplomacy," has
its advocates as well as its critics. 174 It has become, de-
spite criticism, an established feature of modern diplomacy.
Where time and situation permit, and the matter is sufficient-
ly important, no foreign minister would deny himself the role
of the negotiator in favor of a diplomatic or foreign office
official. Second, since many matters of highly technical
character pertaining to ministries other than the foreign
ministry are now becoming the subjects of negotiation which
require expertise in varied matters, the practice of sending
ad hoc missions has become a common feature. Also it has be-
come common practice to send a highly reputed non-career diplo-
mat on special ad hoc missions in which he may have a unique
expertise. Third, "summit diplomacy," i.e., the heads of
statesor governmentsthemselves meeting for discussion is also
a well established practice. The chief advantage of such meet-
ings is assumed to be that they will provide an opportunity for
the chief policy-makers to become acquainted with and under-
stand each other, and to develop cordial relationships.1 7 5
These high officials may be able to settle matters which ordi-.
nary diplomats, operating within the limits set by their in-
structions, find it difficult to settle. But it should be
noted that these high officials may not possess the skills of
a trained diplomat, and this deficiency should be remedied,
173. E.g., when the British Government sent to Moscow
a Foreign Office official, one Mr. Strang, to build up an
anti-Nazi front, it roused the suspicion of the Soviet Govern-
ment about the sincerity of the British Government and the
mission failed. See Churchill, The Gathering Storm, at 347.
174. See Thayer, supra note 41, at 108; Brooklngs In-
stitution Foreign Policy Study, at 110.
175. There is the possibility of developing prejudice
also. Lall, supra note 136, at 150, states that the personal
feelings of the head of state, government, or other responsible
person, when aroused, affect not only the negotiations which
occasioned such arousal, but all the relations with the nation-
state whose official caused it.
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when necessary, by accompanying aides and advisers.
These categories of people, however, may not have the
skills required for effective performance in parliamentary
diplomacy. Hence, the practice of sending parliamentarians
as delegates has developed.
For participation in the adjudicative arena, the quali-
fications needed by the intermediary differ from those neces-
sary for personnel representing the contesting parties. For
the latter role, persons having bargaining skills are the ob-
vious choice. Skill at arguing the case before the inter-
mediary and the adversary is also obviously required. As for
the intermediary, skills apart, he should be acceptable to the
parties and command their respect. Since an intermediary can
obtain a certain degree of control over the process of com-
munication in the arena, the parties will always see that there
is the possibility of his use of control to the disadvantage of
either. The personal qualities of the intermediary should be
such as to minimize these fears. The group to which he belongs
also becomes material. If he is an international official, he
will be perceived as being free from external pressures; the
pressures incidental to his being a servant of a particular
organization will be expected to be circumscribed by the objec-
tives of that organization. In the case of a national offi-
clal, however, unless the nation-state to which he belongs ap-
pears to have a genuine Impartial interest in the settlement
he is unlikely to be acceptable to the parties concerned. To
depoliticize the intermediary's role, therefore, Latin Ameri-
can states have developed the unique practice of selecting
private individuals of high repute for the role. 176
The ability to draft written instruments, understand
the implications of the written word, and develop alternative
linguistic formulas are indispensable skills in all arenas.
Since the skills needed are varied, diplomatic interactions
are usually conducted by a team of specialists with various
skills headed by a leader, rather than a single individual.
The team may be composed of officials selected from the for-
eign office, other domestic departments, and field missions.
Persons on mediation missions, whether consisting of inter-
national officials or others, are also generally given the
assistance of aides and advisers.
(d) Choice of arenas
Ordinarily the groups' policy-makers prefer the bi-
lateral arena since it facilitates discussions without at-
176. See Arts. 9 and 11 of the Inter-American Treaty
of Good Offices and Mediation, Buenos Aires, 1936, 188 L.N.T.S.,
at 75.
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tracting the attention and pressures of the public and of
third-parties, and without the constraints of rigid agenda and
procedures. When the bilateral arena is considered unsuitable
the choice shifts to another arena. The reason for this shift
may include the fact that: (1) there are more than two par-
ties; (2) the arena itself cannot be formed due to the refusal
of the other party to negotiate the particular issue; (3) nego-
tiations in the past have not proved fruitful; or (4) there is
a degree of hostility between the groups that makes their
leaders averse to direct negotiation.
Both parties usually expect that discussions in the
arena will remain secret. Secrecy may be broken, however, if
the attention of the public in one or both of the negotiating
nation-states is engaged to such a high degree that disclosure
either unilaterally or jointly is compelled by public pressure.
If one of the parties makes a disclosure of a position without
the assent of the others, retaliatory disclosures by the other
party are to be expected.
A conference arena is appropriate when multiple parties
are involved and when more than one issue requires discussion.
This arena facilitates communication among many participants
within a short time, and the ascertainment of their positions
about the issues. If a participant can find support for his
position among participants, he can transform the support into
pressures to obtain the assent of those having different views.
When the opposing party finds that he cannot muster enough sup-
port for his position, he might review and revise his posi-
tion. 177 This advantage, however, is a double-edged weapon;
hence any participant who takes an issue to a conference may
find himself under persuasions and pressures to modify or re-
verse his positions,
It is frequently pointed out that international con-
ferences convened without adequate preparation are not likely
to end fruitfully. The preparation referred to here is not
the study and analysis of intelligence and formulation of al-
ternatives, but exchanges of views by written correspondence
involving carefully drafted Notes. 1% Here professional dip-
lomats express their strong disagreement with the faith which
Lloyd George and his contemporary, statesmen reposed in con-
ference diplomacy. He is reported to have said, "I wish the
French and ourselves never wrote letters to each other. Let-
ters are the very devil. They ought to be abolished alto-
gether. . . . If you want to settle a thing you see your op-
177. E. Jackson, supra note 4, at 89, 134.
178. See Nicolson, supra note 2, at 158; Craig & Gil-
bert, supra note 24, at 27.
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ponent and talk it over with him. The last thing you do is to
write him a letter."1 79 His disdain for professional diplo-
mats is reflected in his remarks, "Diplomats were invented
simply to waste time. It is simply a waste of time to let
[important matters] be discussed by men who are not au-
thorized to speak for their countries." But professional
diplomats assail Lloyd George's diplomacy for the paucity of
the results it yielded from 1919 to 1922; for the exchange of
incompatible views in public it occasioned; for the conclusion
of conferences with resolutions and declarations containing
high-sounding platitudes to satisfy public interest aroused
by the fanfare heralding the conferences; and for the mutual
suspicion it developed between the British and the French.
In contrast they point out the splendid example of the Con-
gress of Berlin of 1878, which met, after the leading Powers
had agreed on the main points, to give the agreements a for-
mal and complete shape.180
If a conference meets without adequate preparation in
the sense of agreement on principal issues, lengthy negoti-
ations and a termination of the conference without an agree-
ment are likely results. This is likely to be so even if the
participants are heads of state or government who possess ex-
tensive power to make decisions. An examination of the past
"summit" conferences shows that under favorable conditions,
such as when allies met during a war, they helped to clear up
misunderstandings, 18 1 and arrivedat agreements on broad pol-
icy issues leaving the details to be worked out by lower of-
ficials.18i Under less favorable conditions the most that
was achieved was a basis for further discussions. Yet one of
the summit's purposes is to bring to the attention of the
chief decision-makers information about the other elites which
has failed to filter through the hierarchy of their respec-
tive foreign offices and diplomatic missions.
It seems that ordinarily preference is not given to
the parliamentary diplomatic arena. 183 Each party going be-
179. Id., at 44.
180. Du--nn, supra note 103, at 95.
181. Churchill, in relation to his first visit to
Moscow, in August 1942, says that when he informed Stalin
about the delay in opening the second front in Europe, "I am
sure that the disappointing news I brought could not have
been imparted except by me without leading to really serious
drifting apart." Churchill, The Hinge of Fate at 437.
182. See K. Eubank, supra note 24, especially the last
chapter.
183. This seems to be true with the United Nations;mem-
bers prefer to resort 16 bilateral and traditional channels rath-
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fore it will have to face open debate and also pressures from
the members to accept some tolution or other. If the re-
quired skill is not used in the debates the protagonists may
take positions which they later find it difficult to give up.
But there is a fairly high expectation that the Initial posiq
tions of the protagonists are likely to differ from the final.
ones, so that changes in position before a final settlement
will not cause embarrassment. If each of the contending par-
ties finds it possible to show that he has gained something
from the solution that is evolved, public opinion will be ao
more of an impediment to settlement than is the case with
settlements reached by secret negotiations and published later.
The chief advantage of the parliamentary diplomatic
arena is that it facilitates the steady accretion of support
for one's own positions,1 9° and opposition to the adversary's.
18 5
The interactions in the arena may help to resolve conflicts in
a fairly short time, as has happened in the case of the dis-
pute between Italy and Austria over Bozen, or over a long
time, or merely to encapsulate the conflict to prevent erup-
tion of large scale violence. The recalcitrance displayed by
an elite in bilateral or small group negotiations may be ex-
posed in this arena and the elite might be influenced to al-
ter its position.
The entry into the adjudicative arena is ordinarily a
result of the initiatives and pressures of third-parties in-
terested in the peaceful settlement of conflicts rather than
by voluntary choice. A contestant, however, who believes
that he has a better cause than his adversary may be more re-
ceptive to the mediatory initiatives than his adversary. When
a contestant enters a conference or parliamentary diplomatic
arena, he should necessarily expect the Initiation of the
processes of mediation by international officials, by the or-
gan to which the complaint is presented, and by the members
thereof.
(e) Choice of the Venue
The place where the negotiations are conducted, where
a conference is held, or where an organ of an International
er than to the U.N. See K.J. Holsti, "Resolving Interna-
tional Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on
Procedures," 10 J. of Conf. Res. 272, 287 (1966); also Hadwen
Kaufmann, supra note 135, at 61.
184. Id., chap. 5, presents a case study of the SUNFED.
185. A._Yeselson & A. Gaglione, A Dangerous Place: The
U.N. as a Weapon in World Politics chap. 2 (1974), on what the
authors call"the politics of embarrassment."
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organization holds its meetings is likely to influence the
outcome. President Wilson is said to have rejected Geneva,
The Hague and London as unsuitable for peace negotiations,
but Paris turned out to be most damaging to the outcome.18 6
The view may be held that if the U.N. were located at a place
other than New York, the outcomes of the deliberations of its
organs would be different.187 This view is based upon the
assumption that the comments and opinions expressed in the
local press affect the participants in the negotiations, con-
ferences, or meetings of the organs. Viewed in this way,
every place in the world may be said to have its own effect;
the general preference of antagonists for a neutral site for
negotiations is easily understood. It is also obvious that
participants prefer a place where good communications with
home authorities are available, and where they have access to
comfortable surroundings in which to work.
3. Communication with other Elites
(a) Form of communication
Communication with the other elites is written as well
as verbal. It can also be done by acts. Indeed, in crisis
situations, it is likely that communication will be more by
acts than words, one of the reasons being that words may not
then carry much credibility. During the Cuban missile crisis,
for example, several acts of Premier Khrushchev, such as call-
ing on the American opera singer, Jerome Hines, signaled an
intenti n of the Soviet Union to avoid open hostilities over
Cuba. 18 8 However, a major portion of communication is by the
spoken word, and all material worth recording in permanent
form is put in writing. Communications to international or-
ganizations, as such, will necessarily be in writing.
The forms of written communication generally used are
the following: The first is a Note. The minister for for-
eign affairs who intends to send a Note to a foreign nation-
state transmits it through the diplomatic representative of
his state to the foreign state, or through the diplomatic
representative of the latter accredited to his state.1 9 Re-
plies to the Notes are sent in the same fashion. The Note is
usually addressed in the first person; the third person form
186. Nicolson, supra note 170, at 76.
187. See Hadwen & Kaufmann, supra note 135, at 51, 62-
63 on the advantages and disadvantages at New York.
188. See Young, supra note 9, at 139.
189. e- S-tow, supra note 45, at 61 and 70.
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is intended to show a stiff posture. Notes bear the signa-
ture of the sending authority, and are formal in tone. Gen-
erally the minister for foreign affairs instructs the diplo-
matic official to present the Note in person to the minister
for foreign affairs of the other state; sometimes he instructs
him to read it to the minister and leave a copy with him. The
representatives of several nation-states may present a Collec-
tive Note or an Identic Note, i.e., different Notes having the
same substance.190 Less formal than a Note is a Note Verbale,
written in the third person, neither addressed nor siqned,.but
ended with the conventional greetings of courtesy. 1 9 1" It is
often used as a record of a conversation or to address a ques-
tion. Less formal than either of these is a Memorandum
(memoire, pro-memoria), which is a detailed presentation of
facts and arguments based on those facts. It differs from a
Note in that it does not begin or end with expressions of
courtesy and need not be signed. It may be accompanied.by a
covering Note. 19 2 Notes Verbales and Memoranda may also be
addressed by the minister for foreign affairs to the diplo-
matic representatives accredited to his state. International
officials also currently use these forms. A particular form
of Memorandum is the aide-memoire, a short written memorandum
given at the end of an interview between the minister for for-
eign affairs and the diplomatic official of a foreign state;
it contains a summary of the representation the latter is in-
structed to make.19 3 An ultimatum is a Note or a Memorandum
presented by a government or its diplomatic representative
to another government which sets forth clearly what is de-
manded of that government, and which requires a prompt, clear
response within the time specified. It is the last word from
a negotiating party implying at the minimum a threat to break
off the negotiations. 1 4 Each of these forms has its own im-
plications, expressive of claims, agreement, disagreement, re-
sentment, protest and peremptory demand.
190. Nicolson, supra note 2, at 239; Satow, supra
note 45, at 67 and 69. The expression "parallel notes" is
used to denote Notes having the same substance but different
language.
191. See Satow, supra note 45, at 62.
192. Id., at . At one time, such a covering Note
was called a deduction, or expose de motifs.
193. Nicolson, supra note 2, at 238. Thayer, supra
note 41, at 99, also explains these conventional expressions.
For the very extensive meaning of demarche, see Satow, supra
note 45, at 111.
194. Id. at 105; Nicolson, supra note 2, at 242.
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(b) Content of communication
The content of communication necessarily depends upon
the objective which the communicator has in view. When con-
currence or collaboration between participants is not neces-
sary, the communication may simply be what the participant
considers relevant to achieve his goal. For example, where it
is intended that a decision-maker should be supplied with some
information for reaching a decision, the communication may
simply be a transmission of that information. On the other
hand, where the concurrence or collaboration of another or
other participants is necessary for the attainment of the ob-
jective, whether it be a particular variety of public order
decisions or value acquisition or exchange, the communication
should have some reference to the latter's perspectives. Com-
munications should then be so shaped as to lead to a discov-
ery of the perspectives common to or compatible with the in-
teracting participants, and to develop such others as are
necessary for attaining the objective. Communication would
then be molded to persuade, pressurize and even coerce, the
other party to conclude a bargain favorable to the communi-
cator. In what follows we shall first focus attention on
techniques relative to the constitutive phases of public order
decisions as objectives, and then proceed to the techniques
pertaining to persuasion, bargaining and coercion in relation
to communication exchange in general.
(i) Public order decisions
Intelligence: Communication with another may be In-
tended merely to convey or obtain some information. The in-
formation obtained or transmitted may affect the decision
reached, regardless of whether that decision has constitutive
or value shaping and distributional consequences.
Recommendation: Through diplomatic communicationrecom-
mendation may be made to any competent authority to take any
particular decision. The range of recommendations is limited
only by the competence of both the communicatee to partici-
pate in the decision process and of the communicator to make
recommendations.
Prescription: There are, broadly speaking, three pro-
cesses by which diplomatic communication may result in pre-
scription. First, if a participant communicates a unilateral
commitment under circumstances where it can be reasonably ex-
pected that others will rely upon it, the commitment will
constitute a prescription for the communicator himself. The
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flow of diplomatic communication may be so directed that it
culminates in such commitment.19 5 Second, diplomatic com-
munications exchanged between the various participants may
create a reasonable expectation about the requirements of the
future course of behavior of any set of participants or the
members of the community in general, hence forming a basis
for an inference of a general practice accepted as customary
international prescription. Statements of claims in the com-
munications, responses to those statements, and even absence
of response In appropriate situations, form such bases. Dip-
lomatic strategy obviously requires a careful drafting of
the statements of claims and responses. Third, diplomatic
communication may result in agreements having prescriptive
consequence.
Where the agreements reached are intended to be given a
written form, diplomatic communication is further directed
towards creating a written instrument. The procedural steps
to be taken in that direction are briefly: (I) the drafting
and "adoption" of the text of the agreement, (ii) "authenti-
cation" of the text, (iii) "expression of the consent to be
bound" by the prescriptions contained therein. 196 These are
the steps that are taken in current practice, and it is open
to the interacting participants to vary these procedural
steps and yet reach the goal of a written instrument carrying
prescriptive efficacy.
"Adoption"of the Text: The written form given to the
shared perspectives of the interacting participants should
receive the assent of all the participants in Its preparation,
and so diplomatic communication should be directed to secure
such assent. In the conference and parliamentary diplomatic
arenas, too, such assent may be required, or the assent of a
particular majority of the participants may be considered as
sufficient.197 In a mediation process the prepared text of
the agreement must receive the assent of the contestants.
The texts may vary in form, ranging from a short, ab-
stract statement which leaves great scope for subsequent
elaboration and particularization, to an extensive and de-
195. See The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53 (1933) at 71, and the Nuclear
Tests Case, I.C.J. Rep. 1974, at 253, 267.
1967 For the sake of convenience we are adopting the
terminology of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna,
1969.
197. The Law of Treaties Convention mentions in Art. 9,
two-third majority, unless the conference by the same major-
ity decides to adopt a different majority.
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tailed statement of mutually expected behavior, which needs
relatively less scope for further articulation of common or
compatible perspectives. Indeed, all texts require inter-
pretation at the stage of their application.198 Sometimes
the text adopted exhibits only the absence of any worthwhile
compatible perspectives. The adoption of such texts is high-
ly disapproved of by the traditionalists in diplomacy, 199 but
it should be noted that they are not completely useless. When
finally concluded, they become the foci of further communica-
tion to evolve compatible perspectives. However, strategists
generally try to safeguard themselves against such texts as
are capable of forming a basis for legitimizing behavior harm-
ful to their side.
"Authentication" of the Text: The text adopted is au-
thenticated by a variety of procedures. The procedure may be
the one specified in the text itself, or agreed upon sepa-
rately by the participants while adopting the text. Besides
these two procedures, there are the practices of authenti-
cating the text by the signature of the participants, signa-
ture ad referendum, initialling,or incorporating iin the Final
Act of the conference that has adopted the text. 2 00 After
the adoption of the text, diplomatic communication may have
to be directed toward securing authentication.
"Expression of the consent-to be bound": There should
be communication by the participants of their commitment to
the future course of behavior set out in the authenticated
text, in the absence of which no firm expectation of such be-
havior on their part can arise. The form of such communica-
tion is largely left to the option of the parties, and is ex-
ercisable explicitly or in an implied manner. In the current
198. We regard the "plain meaning rule" of treaty in-
terpretation as only one of a large set of prescriptions
available to interpreters to shape their interpretations, and
that by itself the rule is neither definitive nor controlling,
and is only manipulative. See in this regard McDougal, Lass-
well & Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World
Public Order (1967).
199. See e.g., Nicolson, supra note 2, at 113, and
Craig & Gilbert, supra note 24, at 29, commenting on the dip-
lomacy of Lloyd George.
200. See I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties 35 (1973). For the meaning of the expressions
"Final Act," "voeux" and "Acte Generale," see Satow, supra
note 45, at 345-347.
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practice, the generally adopted forms of communication are:2 0 1
(a) signature, including initialling where it is mutually
agreed that initialling constitutes signature, and signature
ad referendum followed by confirmation by the authorized of-
ficials of the particular nation-state; (b) exchange of in-
struments, even unsigned notes verbales; (c) ratification;
and (d) acceptance or appro--va commitment to agreements al-
ready fully formalized between other parties is referred to as
accession.202
The internal law of the groups normally prescribes that,
before a commitment is communicated on behalf of the group,
a particular internal decision-making process must be com-
pleted. The internal law of nation-states and of interna-
tional organizations varies a great deal in this regard; the
variation stems from the different patterns of distribution
of authority within the groups. Where the communication of
the commitment creates a genuine expectation of noncompliance
with fundamental internal law, the commitment itself may not
insure public order enforcement.2 0 3 Diplomatic communication
is generally directed towards obtaining a reliable "expression
of the consent to be bound."
Invocation: A large part of the diplomatic communica-
tion consists of invocation of prescriptions, demanding the
application of those prescriptions. The communication sets
out the alleged facts of the situation under reference, and
the policies underlying the invoked prescriptions, and pre-
sents the case for application of the invoked prescriptions
in the manner claimed in the communication. The replies may
present the reasons for not applying the prescriptions, or
for not applying them in the manner suggested.20 There can
be invocation of the prescriptions of the constitutive order,
affirming why the alleged prescriptions should or should not
be regarded as authoritative prescriptions. 2 0 5 Reference Is
201. Here it is not proposed to enter into a dis-
cussion of the theoretical issue whether ratification is es-
sential unless dispensed with, or whether it is not essential.
202. The technical meanings of the expressions men-
tioned here are not given as they are well known to students
of international law and relations.
203. This statement is based on Art. 46 of the Law of
Treaties Convention, which, along with Art. 7, raises several
issues of great complexity,
204. The rules of interpretation are also invoked In
this context.
205. A Note may be "rejected" and for the meaning of
"rejection," see Satow, supra note 45, at 76. More than the
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made in this context to the elements constituting an authori-
tative unilateral commitment, a customary rule, or to those
that render an agreement unenforceable under the public order.
Application: Diplomatic communication consists also of
intimation that a particular prescribed policy has been ap-
plied. A refusal, for example, to recognize or to communicate
with a group of rebels which is not fully organized, intimates
the application of relevant prescriptions.
Appraisal: Appraisals of how the policies have been
working are communicated through diplomatic channels. Such
communications are likely to form an awareness of whether or
not the policies have produced the expected effects, and whe-
ther and how far they need revision.
Termination: Diplomatic communication is directed to
terminate the existing prescriptions. Denunciation of uni-
lateral undertakings and of treaties is communicated through
diplomatic channels. Claims are presented which are contrary
to the supposedly existing customary prescriptions with the
objective of securing acquiescence. Responses to claims for
termination, suspension, or modification of prescriptions form
a considerable part of diplomatic communications.
(ii) Persuasion, Bargaining and Coercion
The reference here is to the process of influencing the
attitudes and behavior of another by verbal communications
which attempt to persuade the communicatee to adopt a particu-
lar attitude or behavior which the communicator desires of
him. Where the communications do not involve promises of high
rewards or threats of severe deprivations which drastically re-
duce the free choice of alternatives by the communicatee, we
treat the process as persuasion, and where they do, as coer-
cion. Bargaining is understood as the process of influencing
the communicatee to make optimum value concessions to the com-
municator, against a minimal concession in return, not dis-
closing during the process the maximum which-the communicator
is prepared to give. These are indeed rough distinctions and
they have no clear demarcating line. The various techniques
and tactics employed in the course of diplomatic communica-
returning of the paper itself, it generally implies rejecting
the contentions therein. The expression "Fin de non recevolr"
means rejection without examining the merits, or absolute re-
fusal to consider the matter. See Nicolson, supra note 2, 236.
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tion to evolve common or compatible perspectives will be men-
tioned here, without specifically stating whether persuasion,
coercion or bargaining is the predominant element in the con-
text. A definitive characterization along those lines can be
made only by a reference to all the factors involved in the
context, and not to the techniques and tactics employed alone.
Since the attitudes and behavior of an actor are deter-
mined by his identifications, expectations, and demands, the
technique involves suitably modifying these subjectivities.
Taking up first identifications, it is common to suggest to
the other interacting party that he adopt a wider or narrower
identification than his present one. When speaking to the
rebel leaders of a country, a diplomat of a foreign nation-
state may either appeal to them to think in terms of their
national identity or draw their attention to the elements
common to them and his own nation, depending on whether his
policy is to discourage or encourage the disintegration of
the nation in which the rebels are located. There may some-
times be an appeal to think in regional terms, such as Asia,
Africa, America, Europe etc., or in ideological terms,
such as West and East. Common interests are always stressed
in bilateral discussions, and sometimes in multilateral dis-
cussions. There may also be occasion when the appeal
is couched in terms of mankind as a whole,206 especially
when a party is asked to give up demands for the sake of the
wider self.20 7
For a successful outcome of the strategy, however, it
is not necessary that the interacting party should adopt the
identifications of the strategists. As long as the identi-
fications do not imply complete mutual hostility, they do not
stand in the way of reaching meaningful agreements. After
the Peace of Westphalia, Protestantism and Catholicism ceased
to be totally antagonistic symbols of identification which pre-
cluded friendly interaction, though they remained separatist
symbols for a long time. At present, East and West, and
North and South, do not represent totally antagonistic groups.
206. Lall, supra note 136, at 103. He states that a
conference (or parliamentary diplomatic) environment provides
a better political context for agreement, since they
may create, among other things, exhortations to act
in the Interests of world harmony.
207. See E. Jackson, supra note 4, at 52, where a tech-
nique used inSweden by mediators of labor disputes is de-
scribed.
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Expectations: A variety of techniques are used to
shape the expectations into common or compatible ones.
Arguments about applicable legal prescriptions: Fre-
quently, a participant's demands are based upon his assump-
tions about the legal prescriptions applicable to his demands,
and as long as these assumptions persist, the demands are not
likely to be given up. Theoretical treatment by scholars of
the negotiation process conveys an Impression that the area
of diplomacy is exclusive to the sphere of legal process and
consists purely of bargaining.208 Quincy Wright contrasted
diplomacy with both war and law.20 9 Organs of international
organizations such as the General Assembly are characterized
as political, implying thereby that parliamentary-diplomatic
discussions and decisions are outside the purview of legal
decision. However, one should not ignore the fact that in
diplomatic exchanges claims are seldom presented as legiti-
mized by naked power, but are almost invariably referred to
as justified by the pre-existing prescriptions and practices.2 10
In the so-called political organs of the U.N., too, such
justification is shown and responses are expressed in terms
of norms which are assumed to carry authority.2 11 Invocation
of naked power is far less likely in a multilateral arena, for
it will possibly produce adverse reactions on the part of the
other participants therein.2 12
208. This point is rightly taken by Eisenberg, supra
note 124, at 637, though, it may be added, the scholars he
refers to were primarily interested-in negotiation process and
negotiating behavior, and not influence of norms.
209. See his "The Role of International Law in Con-
temporary Diplomacy," in Kertesz & Fitzsimons, supra note 3,
at 55, 56.
210. Refer in this connection to P.E. Corbett, Law In
Diplomacy at vii, 271 (1959).
211. Oschar Schachter, "The Relation of Law, Politics
and Action in the United Nations," Hague Recuell, 1963-11,
ctaps. 1 and 2; Eisenberg, supra note 124. Eisenberg's
thesis relates to the negotiation process in general and Is not
confined to diplomacy in the world arena. He, however, makes
a concession in relation to what he calls "rule-making" nego-
tiations, i.e., negotiations for arriving at a sharing ar-
rangement in a new enterprise. Even here, it appears the
parties would necessarily refer to analogies and pre-existing
higher level norms of sharing such as equity, fairness etc.
212. Lali, supra note 136, at 113, says, "the larger
the conference, the weaker and the less influential is any
individual member of it."
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There may, however, be a situation in which the demand
of the adversary is one for terminating or radically depart-
ing from a supposedly current prescription. In such a situ-
ation, arguments centering on such prescription may not in-
fluence a change in the adversary's position, nor would they
do so when the adversary relies on naked power to achieve his-
objective.
Disclosures and Clarifications; When the Interacting
participants approach each other, neither is generally fully
aware of the other's expectations and both are fully aware
of that fact. So the purpose of the endeavor will be to ob-
tain a disclosure from the other of his expectations and to
clarify his own. But neither participant may expect that his
disclosure will be fully reciprocated by the other, and nei-
ther side is likely to engage in a straight disclosure of his
expectations and of the.assets and capabilities which ren-
der the expectations realistic. It is, however, true that in
some situations, out of a perceived advantage arising there-
from, there will be disclosure In a credible manner.21 3 But
normally disclosures and clarifications emerge in the course
of exchange of communication, sometimes after a considerable
length of time.
An intermediary's role, if it Is not merely one of lend-
ing good offices, also includes discovery'of the expectations
of the parties in dispute, and indications to the parties of the
unrealistic character of those expectations,if necessary. Remain-
ing outside the emotional field generated by the conflict,the in-
termediary directs his efforts to clarifying the facts and per-
suading the parties to perceive the facts as realistically as pos-
sible.Z 14 The procedure of "inquiry," whether resorted to
within the framework of an International organization or out-
side, is directed to provide the parties (and possibly other
interested parties) with a clarification of the facts and ap-
plicable legal prescriptions. 2 15 A debate in a multilateral
arena also helps the parties and others to obtain clarifica-
213. SEhelllng, supra note 4, at 176. See also note
169 spr.
214. See E. Jackson, supra note 4, at 32, 158; Young,
The Intermediaries, supra note 21, at 36; Boulding, supra
note 13, at 316. J.W. Burton, The Use of Controlled Com-
munication in International Relations (1969) describes an em-
pirical study of the technique of controlled communication.
215. S~rensen, supra note 114, at 681-682. Some judg-
ments of the International Court of Justice also serve mere-
ly this purpose.
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tions and disclosures.
Warnings: The expectation of a participant may be
that if he pursues a demand, others will acquiesce and will
not oppose it. In such a situation, a communicator may bring
to the participant's attention the likely reaction on the
part of others, including his own group. He may point out
that if the demand is pursued, others will have an incentive
to pursue a conflicting demand.216 An argument used to dis-
suade a nation-state from acquiring nuclear arms is-that it
will lead its adversary also to acquire them, drawing both
into the precarious balance of nuclear deterrence. Inter-
mediaries generally warn the parties in dispute about the
consequences of an open conflict or absence of agreement.2 17
Falsehood and Deceit: Nicolson affirms the precepts
left by Callieres and Lord Malmesbury that the most im-
portant virtue of a diplomat is truthfulness.2 18 He explains
this to mean "not merely abstention from conscious misstate-
ments, but a scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of the
false or the suppression of the true." Indeed the use of
falsehoods is a poor technique to change the other partici-
pant's expectations, for he ordinarily would verify the
sources of information and the falsehood would then be ex-
posed. The falsehood is likely to be acted upon without
Verification only in crisis situations when there is not suf-
ficient time available to take the usual precautions. Fur-
ther, agreements reached on the basis of falsehoods are like-
ly to be repudiated when the facts are known. Therefore,
unless the agreement creates something like a transitory ob-
ligation for the other party, which is immediately acted upon,
the positive pay-off for the falsehood seems doubtful and
negative pay-off surely follows discovery. Sir Henry Wotton's
celebrated apothegem, "an ambassador is an honest man who is
sent to lie abroad for the good of his country,"'2 19 is not
216. On the distinction between 'Warnings" and "threats,"
see Ikle, supra note 4, at 62; Schelling, supra note 4, at 123.
A warning presents a predicted detriment to the adversary as
a natural consequence of the latter's contemplated act, where-
as a threat presents it as a punishment, which might entail
loss to the inflicting party also.
217. E. Jackson, supra note 4, at 139; Young, The Inter-
mediaries, supra note 21, at 36.
218. Nicolson, supra note 2, at 107-109. He cites
Callieres and Lord Malmesbury. See also Thayer, supa note
41, at 242.
219. Nicolson, supra note 2, at 44.
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taken by any professional diplomat at present as anything
more than a witticism and a clever pun on "lie." Sir Henry
himself pleaded with James I that he intended it only as a
merriment.
This indeed does not mean that a communicator engaged
in diplomatic communication is expected to make a full dis-
closure of all facts. Lord Malmesbury's advice was to parry
all indiscreet questions, and not to contradict a true state-
ment or admit as true a false statement.2 2 0 What Nicolson
seems to suggest is the necessity to refrain from bad faith
and deception, and not the necessity to supply the adversary
with all available information; the adversary should depend
upon his own resources for intelligence.2 2 1 That apart, Ikle
remarks, 'What would be condemned as a lie in one situation
may be a shrewd tactic in another." 22 2 This implies that the
use of falsehood and deceit is a distinct possibility where a
positive pay-off is foreseen.
Creating Trust: The expectations of the other party
about the reliability and trustworthiness of the communica-
tor's group to keep engagements solemnly undertaken may not
be very high, and this makes the progress of negotiations ex-
ceedingly difficult. The participant who doubts the reli-
ability of the other would want safeguards against possible
cheating to be built into the arrangement and Insurance
against being worse off in such an event than when there Is
no agreement at all. The trend of disarmament negotiations
since the 1920's amply demonstrates this phenomenon. Moral
exhortations by outsiders to develop mutual trust are ac-
corded little weight. Trust Is likely to develop, however,
out of past experiences of compliance. Also there may be
situations when the benefit accruing from cheating appears
less attractive than the loss arising thereby, including the
loss of reputation for reliability. Trust can be developed
then by creating a continuing relationship which can give
rise to instances of compliance. Negotiators take the cue
from this and structure what seems a single transaction into
a series of transactions, so that at any stage if a party
fails to comply, the other can exercise the option of termi-
nating the arrangement.2 2 3 The technique involves a re-
220. Id., at 112; Thayer, supra note 41, at 243,
221. F-or the view that full disclosure of all facts is
not expected, see Thayer, supra note 41, 242.
222. Note 4 supra, 106.
223. Schelling, supra note 4, at 45. In this connec-
tion, refer to principles 7 and 5 adopted in McCloy-Zorin
Agreement of 1961 regarding disarmament.
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structuring of expectations about mutual reliability.
Enunciation of issues, arranging their priorities,
splitting and combining of issues: The expectation of a
participant in relation to an issue depends partly on how the
issue is formulated. Further, the formulation becomes the
point of departure for evaluating the possible gains and
losses.224 In the mediation process it becomes the task of
the mediator to formulate the issue for the parties, and in
so doing he should not appear to be partial to either side.
In the multilateral arena, too, the way in which a resolution
is drafted shapes the expectations and the response of the
participants. After the issues have been enunciated, prior-
ities among the issues for discussion should be determined.
The determination of an issue in a particular manner affects
the expectation about the issues next in order. It is for this
reason that the fixing of the agenda itself becomes a matter
of extensive discussion, and negotiations may break off at
that stage.2 25 The order in which resolutions are put to
vote frequently forms a matter of serious contention in the
parliamentary-diplomatic arena. Strategists always endeavor
to see that enunciation of issues and the ordering of their
priorities do not place them in a disadvantageous situation;
and if they are strongly motivated to see that negotiations
progress, they will not drive an opponent to the point of
cessation of discussion on these matters.
The expectations about an Issue also depend upon the
context in which it is seen, whether a broader or a narrower
one. It may be easier to harmonize the expectations of the
various participants if an issue is split into a number of
issues. The resolution of some of these issues, even if
they are peripheral, may make it easier to shape the expec-
tations towards compatibility in relation to others.
2 26
Sometimes the combining of issues may make it easier to de-
velop compatible expectations.2 2 7
Commitments and bluffs: The other participant may be
under an expectation that the strategists will concede his
demands if only he stands firm and does not yield. To pre-
224. Ik-e, supra note 4, at 218; Young, The Inter-
mediaries, supra note 21, at 49.
225. The Foreign Ministers Conference at Paris in
1951 met for four months, failed to agree upon the agenda,
and broke off.
226. Lali, supra note 136, at 173; Ikle, supra note 4,
at 223.
227. See id., at 222. Sometimes" package deals succeed.
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vent him from entertaining such an expectation, generally
the technique of commitment is employed. A commitment may
be stated to be a communication to the other party that the
first would not go beyond a certain point in responding to
the other party's demands. A commitment when communicated
in a credible manner modifies the expectations of the other
party, and leaves him the options of either playing the game
with the limitation or of abandoning it. It is a matter of
common experience that on the eve of negotiations with a
strong adversary, statesmen make an open proclamation of
their commitments.228 There is also the possibility that the
other party takes the commitment to be bluff and continues to
press his demand.
Promises and threats: Promises do affect expectations
depending upon what is promised and whether the promises are
credible. A promise is more than a commitment to make a con-
cession; it involves an affirmation that the commitment will
be kept, and thereby the reputation for keeping the pledged
word is made a matter at stake.
A threat is also a commitment that if the other does not
act as desired he will be made to suffer some loss or dam-
age.2 29 A threat implies that the carrying out of the threat
hurts both the parties, but it will hurt the party threatened
more than the party carrying it out. A good example of threat
falling directly in the realm of diplomacy is the Hallstein's
doctrine.2 30 After carrying it out by severing diplomatic re-
lations with Yugoslavia and Cuba, West Germany reinterpreted
it so as not to necessitate its application in the case of some'
African and Asian countries that entered into a form of rela-
tions with East Germany.
Fait accompli: A fait accompli is rated as "the most ef-
fective weapon of international diplomacy."2 3 1 It is an act
that forces the other party to revise radically his expecta-
tions. He cannot thereafter press some of his demands.
Demands: Modification of identifications and expecta-
228. Schelling, supra note 4, at 36; Ikle, supra note
4, at 62.
229. Soulding, supra note 13, at 253; Schelling, supra
note 4, at 123; Ikle, supra note 4, at 62.
230. See Bot, supra note 127, at i1.
231. Paul Zinner, "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of
Eduard Benes," in Craig and Gilbert, supra note 24, at 100,
103.
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tions may influence the leaders of the other group to give
up such of their demands as are incompatible with the de-
mands of the strategists. If modification does not occur to
the desired extent, or does not lead to a modification of de-
mands, some additional techniques should be adopted to bring
about compatibility of demands, While in pursuit of this ob-
jective, it is pointed out, negotiators have a continual three-
fold choice, either to settle on the basis of the terms of-
fered by the other participant, or to continue the bargaining
with the hope of obtaining better terms, or to discontinue the
negotiations.2 32 The choice also presents itself as whether
to induce the other party to remain in negotiations or to
drive him to the necessity of breaking off. Using the game
theory terminology, it may be stated that when the other par-
ticipant perceives the game to be a zero- or fixed-sum game,
and that he might be better off by retiring to the "inimax"
or "saddle-point" than by continuing it, he will abandon the
negotiations. 2 3 3 The participant perceives the negotiations
to be useless for obtaining satisfaction of his demands, even
perhaps partially, and that he canstabilizehis gains or loss-
es at a certain level without having any understanding at all.
Where a positive outcome is desired from the negotiations, each
participant should see that the other does not find the retire-
ment to the saddle-point attractive. In other words, the game
should be made to appear as a variable-sum game which is worth
playing for obtaining a better pay-off than the pay-off ex-
pected at the saddle-point.
We may set out a few techniques generally employed to
evolve compatibility of demands. The first and the obvious
step is to reduce one's own demand. In order to not give away
anything unnecessarily, the negotiators on either side engage
in chaffering. Protracted haggling, however, may cast a doubt
on the sincerity of the party that overplays this technique.
A similar result will ensue when the party raises his demand
as soon as his original demand is conceded, or presents a
fresh demand, and especially so when the fresh demand is of an
extortionary character.234
Second, the other party may be offered some values as a
substitution for the demands he is asked to give up. A media-
232. Ikle, supra note 4, chap. 5.
233. The concept of "minimax" or "saddle-point" was de-
veloped by Neumann and Morgenstern. On this see also,
Boulding, supra note 13, at 44; Kaplan supra note 12, at 175.
234. This is a demand that does not bring much benefit
to the party making it, but entails a high detriment to the
party to whom it is presented. See Ikle, supra note 4, at 208.
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tor's success generally depends upon his ability to offer any
values as a compensation to the party that is asked to give
up some of its demands.2 3 5
Third, if the other participant had made any commitment,
he should be helped to release himself from it if that is
possible. If it can be made to appear that he received sub- -
stantially what he demanded, or if he is supplied with casuis-
tic arguments or rationalizations for abandoning the commit-
ment, he might modify his demands. A mediator's special task
is to enable either or both the sides to stage a retreat with-
out losing face, for "a face saved may be a dispute re-
solved."23 6
Fourth, the strategists may cause pressures to build up-
for investment by the opposing elite on other matters than the
pursuit of the demands it is presently pressing hard. For an
elite, the value of what it demands increases with the in-
vestments it makes, and with that the incentive to invest fur-
ther also increases.2 3 7 But the incentive is likely to dimin-
ish if pressures build up for investment on other pursuits.
An elite desirous of acquiring nuclear arms, for instance, may
have to defer this demand in the face of pressures for invest-
ment on welfare measures generated by discussions in the
multilateral arenas. If the rank and file is influenced by
these discussions, the elite would be hard put to find the re-
sources necessary for both, and might be forced to postpone
the weapons program. The leaders of a nation-state making a
demand on a neighboring nation-state for a piece of territory
might give it up if they are confronted by the demand of a
dissident group for separation, and hence the strategists
might contact the dissident elite and encourage them to press
their separatist demand.238 Or if the leaders find that
another neighboring nation-state comes forward with a demand
235. Refer to note 115. The success of the World
Bank's mediation of the Indus waters dispute was due to the
offer of mediatory values.
236. E. Jackson, supra note 4, at 27; Young, The In-
termediaries, supra note 21, at 39.
237. See Edmead, supra note 115, at 9. The model he
builds up may be seen as illustrative of the manner in which
pressures might be built up.
238. For an illustration of the use of this technique,
see N.Y. Times, July 31, 1976, at 5, col. 1. In 1972, Iran
requested the U.S.A. to supply arms to the Kurdish rebels in
Iraq, and the U.S.A. supplied one million dollars worth of
captured Soviet arms. Later, Iran and Iraq reached an agree-
ment on their border dispute, and further supplies were
stopped.
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for a more valuable piece of the former's territory, they
might defer their demand against the first neighbor. Diplo-
macy also has to be used in those contexts to see that other
elites do not lend additional resources to the elite against
which the strategy is directed.
Fifth, the strategists may deliberately create a crisis
with the hope that it will lead the other party to give up
some of his demands with a view to escaping from the danger-
ous situation created thereby.
Sixth, the strategists, under favorable conditions, may
steer the bargaining towards what are called focal points for
producing compatibility in demands.2 39 A focal point is a
basis of accommodation of-mutual demands which appears to the
parties, because of geographical factors, precedents, or com-
mon pattern of human behavior, to be a pominent basis of solu-
tion. Boundaries are agreed to by reference to geographical
features. A settlement on the basis of each party meeting
the other half way appears reasonable under some circumstances.
Even if a focal point is not apparent at the outset, a nego-
tiator, a mediator, the president of an international organ
or conference, or an influential group therein, may put for-
ward, in a dramatic way, a suggestion that may become a focal
point. What is agreed upon by some Influential nation-states
is likely to become a focal point for others, and may result
in due course in a series of similar agreements.
Seventh, the strategists may be able to drive the other
party into a "prisoner's dilemma" situation, by opening simul-
taneously negotiations with another party, under conditions
such that the two parties have nil, or very restricted, com-
munication, and present the context as one in which the party
that makes a concession first, benefits, and the other suffers.
Situated in such a position, a party may make more concessions
than it would ordinarily do. Just before World War II, the
Allied Powers (Britain and France), Nazi Germany and the
U.S.S.R., placed themselves, each against the other two, in a
roughly analogous situation. The triangular maneuvers re-
sulted in the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact which cleared
the way for the war.
Eighth, a similar but less coercive move is to open
negotiations simultaneously with two parties, and to plead
with both that if a concession is made to one, it will have
239. The concept of "focal point" was discussed by
Schelling, supra note 4, at 67; Ikle, supra note 4, at 213;
and Young, The Intermediaries, supra note 21, at 39, refers
to it as salient point.
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
to be made to the other also, and thus escape making such a
concession.2 40
4. Techniques Specialized to the Parliamentary
Diplomatic and Parliamentary Arenas
In these arenas, since they are open and the number of
participants is large, the problem of ordering discussion
arises. As a set of prescriptions of procedure and the ad-
ministrators thereof emerge, the strategists face the task'of
determining how to manipulate the rules to achieve their own
objectives.
The conferences held in the last century did not pre-
sent problems of regulation of discussions in the open forum
since they constituted merely arenas of negotiation. The
Congress of Westphalia was no more than two simultaneous
mediations conducted at two different places, Mnster and
Osnabrck.24 1 The Congress of Vienna was a Big Four or Big
Five negotiation, and the Congress as a whole never met.2 42
Parliamentary style of discussion had its rudimentary begin-
ning at the Congress of Berlin of 1878, but the Congress met
more or less to formalize the secret agreements already con-
cluded by the Big Powers. Bismarck,who presided over the
Congress, firmly refused to allow matters of procedure to af-
fect the discussion of substantive issues.2 43 The First and
Second Hague Peace Conferences for the first time appeared
more similar to assemblies than Big Power negotiation exer-
cises. They operated on the principle of unanimity, and on
the basis of a set of rules of procedure that formed a hybrid
between parliamentary practice and small group negotiations.2 44
After the establishment of the League of Nations, permanent or-
gans of international organizations have come to possess their
own standing rules of procedure, and ad hoc conferences now
consider at the outset the provisional rules of procedure pre-
pared for the conference and adopt them.
In a parliamentary or parliamentary diplomatic arena,
apart from what goes on behind the scenes, discussions con-
verge on draft resolutions proposed on the items on the agenda.
Each participant has as an immediate, as well as long term,
goal the gaining of support for his own demands, and winning
240. On such intersecting negotiations, see Schelling,
supra note 4, at 30.
241. Dunn, supra note 103, at 51.
242. C.K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 71 (1920);
Dunn, supra note 103, at 63.
- 43 Id., at 95.
244. I-d., at 132.
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over the supporters of the adversary's demands. There may be
some who take up the role of a "fire brigade," ready to take
the initiative to introduce proposals that would effect a com-
promise between the radically divided groups of participants.245
The first aim of the strategist is to ensure that his pro-
posals are adopted with the requisite majority.2 46 The next
one is to defeat the proposal of the adversary by seeing to it
that it does not get the requisite majority. Since this task
cannot be always achieved by a merely negative approach, ini-
tiative is taken to introduce directly, or indirectly through
others, resolutions on the same subject which appear to the
participants in general to be preferable to those proposed by
the adversary. An alternative to this is to move or encourage
others to move, and subsequently gather support for, amendments
which would render the adversary 's proposal innocuous for the
strategist's side, or useless from the adversary's point of
view, The proceedings are regulated by the presiding officer
and the assembly itself, in accordance with the prescribed
rules of procedure. These rules are invoked to obtain an op-
portunity to speak or reply, to propose items for discussion,
resolutions, amendments, or procedural steps, such as contin-
uing, closing or recessing discussions, assigning priorities
to the items on the agenda, and to resolutions and amendments
already proposed, for the purpose of discussion or voting.
Rules are also invoked to invite the presiding officer to
give rulings on issues of procedure, and to challenge the
rulings. These and other similar moves are taken to ensure
that the resolutions (whether they become prescriptions im-
mediately on acceptance, or only steps in the process of
prescription) proposed by the participant are adopted, and
those introduced by the adversary are defeated.
F. Outcomes
The most general statement that can be made about the out-
come of diplomatic interactions is that each elite becomes in-
formed about the perspectives of the other elites and informs
them of its own perspectives. Each obtains an opportunity to
form an image of others, and to influence the perceptions of
its own image. This mutual communication is not indeed full
245. The expression "fire brigade" was first used by
The Economist. See Hadwen & Kaufmann, supra note 135, at 65.
246. This is indeed too brief an account of the tech-
niques, but considered adequate for the present purpose. For
detailed discussion, see Hadwen & Kaufmann, supra note 135;
Kaufmann, supra note 1O2; P.C. Jessup, supra note 144.
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and does not create fully realistic images. Nevertheless,
some images are formed which are useful for facilitating the
employment of the diplomatic process itself for maintaining,
shaping and improving the public order, and civic orders, or
value exchanges and value shaping and sharing arrangement
brought about by non-violent means. Having made this general
statement, we shall proceed to state more specifically the
various value outcomes.
i. Participation in the constitutive process
of decision
Diplomacy facilitates participation of all the elite
groups in the-processes of public order decision, or at least
in some phases of decision. International officials, national
officials and nonofficials obtain access to participation, but
their roles vary. Nonofficials are admitted only to the
phases of intelligence, promotion and appraisal, and interna-
tional officials to these and to a marginal extent to the
prescription, invocation and termination processes. Only the
officials of nation-states as a general category obtain ac-
cess to all the phases. But even among these, the officials
of some nation-states do not get access to all arenas, and
hence there arises a differentiation in roles, besides the
variation expected from the different levels of effective
power possessed by the respective nation-states. The offi-
cials of some nation-states may obtain only a highly limited
role when they get recognition from only a few nation-states
and admission to none or few international organizations--a
result that can ensue from the exercise of the influence of
the more powerful nation-states. Contrariwise, some elites
occasionally obtain access to participation, despite their
lack of control over a territory or the population therein,
and in the face of the opposition of the control ling elites.
Such admission to participation, whereby the former could
press claims against the latter, affects the latter's parti-
cipation in public order decisions for the particular terri-
tory.
Employing the diplomatic processes, the officials of
nation-states have so far succeeded in expanding to a vast
extent the constitutive machinery of public order decisions.
A large number of international organizations have been es-
tablished apart from the vast network of diplomatic missions
and consular posts established by the beginning of this cen-
tury, the prescriptions and practices connected therewith,
and the vast opportunities for bilateral interaction for con-
stitutive purposes afforded thereby. These have expanded the
scope for participation by the officials of nation-states,
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and have significantly provided opportunities for non-terri-
torial actors--international officials and nonofficials--to
play an influential role. An increase in multilateral diplo-
macy at the expense of bilateral diplomacy, and the survival
of diplomatic missions as consulates is predicted.247 But
the fact has to be observed that the vital prescriptive and
terminating functions still rest substantially with national
officials, and are exercised at higher levels of authority at
national capitals. Transnational parliamentary institutions
slated in the Assembly of the E.E.C. and of the Council of
Europe have not grown In authority and functions as was hoped
for.2 48 International organizations currently provide con-
ference- or parliamentary-diplomatic arenas and not parlia-
mentary ones. The farthest limit reached in vesting pre-
scriptive functions in international organs seems to be the
power of the Assembly of the WHO and of the Council of ICAO
to issue certain types of regulations which become prescrip-
tions for members unless they express disapproval or reserva-
tions.2 49 There is further a general preference among the
national elites for the diplomatic processes over the judi-
cial process, since the former are assumed to give the con-
testants participation in the making of decisions, whereas the
latter involves imposition from above.
Diplomatic procedures now provide as wide a participa-
tion in the process of reaching value shaping and distribu-
tion decisions as in constitutive decisions, but the alloca-
tion of functions in both of the processes is more or less the
same, with national officials having preponderance over inter-
national officials and nonofficials. Retention by the offi-
cials of nation-states of a preponderance of authority in
their own hands should not surprise anyone, since they them-
selves constructed the various diplomatic institutions, pos-
sess effective power, and perceive themselves as having great-
er responsibilities towards their respective nation-states
than the participants of other categories.
2. Shaping and sharing of values
A most significant outcome of diplomatic interaction Is
information to both sides. Communication necessarily brings
in enlightenment value, and face-to-face communication defi-
247. Galtung and Ruge, supra note 150, at 103.
248. See regarding the Assembly of the E.E.C.,
Mathijsen, supra note 51, chap. 3; and of the Council of
Europe, Robertson, supra note 51, chap. 3.
249. Sdrensen, supra note 114, at 633, 648.
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.nitely brings in more information than either communication
through the written word or by act. Comparing the value of
a personal interview with that of intelligence which experts
by their insights and inferences are supposed to discover, an
experienced diplomat queries, "How does a scientific Intelli-
gence expert take into consideration and evaluate a subtle
smile he never saw or a handshake he never felt?"2 50 He does
not belittle the contribution of the scientific intelligence
group; he only emphasizes the utility of reports by diplo-
mats. And the personal contacts of the diplomat are not lim-
ited to the minister for foreign affairs of the receiving
nation-state and the officials of the foreign office thereof,
but extend to other officials at different levels, leaders of..
political parties both in government and in opposition, non-
official elites,fellow diplomats from other countries, and his
own fellow nationals ofdifferent vocations who come as travel-
lers and gather information. In the parliamentary-diplomatic
arena of an international organization, the scope for obtain-
ing information is even greater.
The information is not confined to what is learned in
personal Interviews. The diplomat has the opportunity of per-
sonal observation of the conditions in the host state,and his
evaluations of the day to day developments are likely to be
more sophisticated than those made in the run-of-the-mill
journalistic reports. The store of information against which
the emerging events are assessed is likely to be greater in
his case than of others of his own country.
Besides discharging their normal functions, the diplo-
matic and consular agents supply in a subtle manner assistance
to their own national secret agents engaged in unearthing the
secrets of the host government. The concern of the officials
of the host state about safeguarding the secrets makes them
adopt measures such as imposition of restrictions on travel
etc., which obstruct even the normal intelligence gathering.
The bargaining techniques employed also lessen the realistic
information obtained as a result of interaction.
Next to enlightenment, we may take affection, or cor-
diality in the relations between the elites. Sustained com-
munication In a carefully shaped framework is likely to gen-
erate mutual goodwill and an attitude of mutual helpfulness.
Diplomats sent abroad are expected, among other things, as
Ermalao Barbaro of the fifteenth century put it, "to win or
to maintain the friendship of a prince."2 5 1 The very same
purpose is mentioned in every scholarly treatise on the func-
250. Thayer, supra note 41, at 182.
251. Rattingly, supra note 31, at 95.
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tions of diplomats, and has recently been reiterated in Art.
3(l)(e) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as
"promoting friendly relations." However, this outcome is
obviously dependent upon several historical and contemporary
factors, such as the political, economic and cultural rela-
tions that existed in the past, the current identifications
of the parties, their expectations and the nature of the de-
mands each has against the other, To these one may add the
predispositions and prejudices of the present ruling elites of
either group.
A third noteworthy outcome is acquisition of power.
The Munich meeting in 1938 between Hitler, Chamberlain,
Daladier and Mussolini gave Hitler the power to snatch the
Sudetenland away from the Czechs, and this power was largely
reinforced when the British and the French rulers put pres-
sure on the Czechs to accept the Munich arrangement, regard-
ing which they were not even consulted. Later, the outcome
of the meeting between Hitler and Hatcha was the surrender of
what remained of Czechslovakia. These results indeed flowed
from the superior military power which Hitler then had and
which made the path of diplomacy easy.
In diplomatic interactions of the zero- or fixed-sum
character, the pay-off of the stronger party will always be
higher. This prevailing expectation makes the ruling elites
frequently affirm that they will negotiate only from a posi-
tion of strength. The paradox involved in this assertion may
be pointed out by saying "one may dictate from strength, but
one does not negotiate."2 52 But the very same phenomenon dis-
suades the weaker from negotiating whenever there is the possi-
bility of becoming stronger, securing allies, or presenting
a fait accomp i.2 3 However, when a stronger elite calls a
weaker Tor negotiation, and the latter has no hope of assis-
tance from a third party, it will be constrained to accept,
whatever be the likely outcome.254 The outcome may be coer-
cion on various levels, the highest of which is exemplified
by the bloodless conquests of Hitler referred to above.
The influence of power disparity is considerably re-
duced in a parliamentary-diplomatic arena wherein the parti-
cipants have equal voting strength. 2 5 5 If the interaction is
252. Boulding, supra note 13, at 323.
253. On the eve -f Poland annexing Taschen in 1939, the
Polish Foreign Minister refused to see the British and the
French Ambassadors, apparently apprehending that the two would
put pressure against taking that step. See Churchill, supra
note 173, at 289.
254. Lall, supra note 136, at 82.
255. Id., at 103. He also states that the General
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of the variable-sum pattern, whatever be the power differen-
tial of the interacting parties, the pay-offs could be satis-
fying to all of them. It should be remembered, however, that
actual situations do not fit exactly into the mathematical
models such as the zero-sum game etc., and each interaction
may have an outcome ranging from pure persuasion to different.
levels of coercion.
Access to diplomatic arenas and the obtaining of favor-
able outcomes earn respect for the participants. The dignity
and deference shown to diplomats and the ceremonials observed
in relation to diplomatic missions convey the respect for the
individual who receives these honors, and the group he repre-
sents. It is one of the reasons why nascent nation-states
seek recognition and admission to membership of international
organizations. The statesman who wins for his nation some-
thing by diplomacy without recourse to violence earns the re-
spect of his nation and of others as well. A successful medi-
ator, whether an international official, national official, or
nonofficial, is respected by all and earns prestige.
Diplomatic interactions have led to the promotion of a
variety of rectitude values in the course of history. Even If
we leave out of account the times when religion figured im-
portantly on the political scale, and refer to the period
sinc;e the Congress of Vienna, there will appear as signifi-
cant instances of the promotion of the values of rectitude
the abolition of slave trade, prohibition of white slave traf-
fic, and promotion of the concept of human rights. A con-
siderable part of diplomatic activity is currently devoted to
securing respect for, and observance of, human rights.
The outcomes of shaping and sharing wealth, skills and
well-being also flow from diplomatic interactions. Arrange-
ments for expansion of trade, movement of capital, transfer-
ence of technology, exchange of scientific information, pro-
motion of health, and production of food, are currently
evolved by diplomatic interactions in bilateral and multi-
lateral arenas. The benefits however accrue in different pro-
portions to different groups, and to different levels among the
members of each group,
While the institutional facilities created for diplomacy
help to promote fruitful diplomatic interactions, they do have
some adverse outcomes as well. For Instance, the contacts
which diplomats maintain with the dissident groups in the re-
ceiving nation-state cause concern to the incumbent elite about
Assembly is preferred by weaker states to the Security Coun-
cil for this reason.
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the security of its power and other values.256 If the prem-
ises of the mission or residences of the diplomatic officials
are used as centers for harboring dissidents and criminals, it
might, among other things, affect the perceptions of the citi-
zens of the host state about the power equations between their
own elite and the elite of the sending state. Irresponsible
behavior of the diplomatic personnel frequently poses a problem
for the rulers of the host state. The "diplomatic bag" is not
always used for its intended purpose, and a most extreme in-
stance of its abuse is that of two Egyptian diplomats in Rome
attempting to send a man in 1964 in "diplomatic mail" to the
Foreign Ministry in Cairo.257 Lesser forms of abuse of the
diplomatic bag are the evasion of export, import and customs
laws.
G. Effects
Diplomacy is an essential feature of the world social
process, and the process of public order decisions, whether
pertaining to the constitutive process or the shaping and dis-
tribution of values. As long as the communication process goes
on without interruption, it rarely becomes a matter of concern
for the world community. It is only when it is interrupted,
either due to the deliberate action of an interacting elite,
or due to the emergence of a crisis, that the community's con-
cern becomes engaged. On the other hand, the advancement of
the interests of all the members of the community depends upon
a sustained flow of communication at the optimal level.
Diplomacy facilitates exchange of values between the in-
teracting groups and arrangements for future exchanges. The
arrangements facilitate pooling of resources for major col-
laborative enterprises and for sharing the profits. The prog-
ress of the community lies in the maximization of the shaping
and sharing of all human values, which will be impossible
without mutual communication and interaction.
Diplomacy is essential for the maintenance and expan-
sion of the world public order inasmuch as communication is
central to all the phases of public order decisions. It is
possible, however, for one to present two inadequacies of the
diplomatic process as a means for bringing about a qualita-
256. Such contacts have existed ever since resident em-
bassies became a common institution. E.g., for the situation
in the time of Queen Elizabeth I, see Mattingly, supra note
31, at 171, 241.
257. See Wilson, supra note 165, at 15.
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tively better world public order. First, diplomacy relies on
the consent of the interacting parties for reaching decision
outcomes that will be consequential to public order, and
where such consent is not forthcoming decisions will not be
reached at all. It is difficult to expect consent where the
demands of the interacting elites are -sharply opposed to each'
other, and even less so when an elite involved perceives its
"vital interests" to be at stake. The preference implied by
this statement is in favor of legislative and judicial process-
es which involve prescription and implementation of pollci'es,
if need be by force, in the name of and on behalf of the com-
munity. Second, it is stated that diplomacy cannot be re-
garded as a method suitable for attaining radical solutions
to conflicts; this unsuitability arises from the very same
requirement of the consent of the parties for a solution.
Changes have to be achieved by incremental stages, winning
the consent of the affected parties at each stage.
There is much validity in these points, though the way
in which they are put tends to weigh the scales more heavily
against diplomacy than is warranted, and so these points re-
quire reformulation. First, agreement is only one of the
outcomes expected of diplomatic communication, ahd there are
others which should not be overlooked. Even if diplomatic
communications merely involve mutual transmission of claims
and counter-claims, there is the possibility of the emer-
gence of unilateral commitments and customary prescriptions
from such exchange. That apart, engaging in negotiation is
less harmful to community values than having recourse to vio-
lence, and is to be welcomed for this reason.258 Until such
time as centralized institutions commanding monopolized con-
trol over instruments of violence, and authorized to interpret
and apply the value preferences of the community are construc-
ted, diplomacy supplies a better alternative than the recourse
to violence. The possibility of entrenched Interests not
yielding to diplomatic persuasions, pressures and coercion has
to be accepted. Second, it is not fully accurate to say that
by diplomacy radical solutions cannot be reached. It may be
recalled that Hitler, Daladier, Chamberlain and Mussolini pro-
vided by diplomacy a radical solution to the Sudeten question.
The Congress of Vienna and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919
effected an extensive redrawing of the political maps. With-
258. It seems that the view presented by Ikle, supra
note 4, at 46, that negotiation does not assure refraining
from recourse to violence is preferable to the one that nego-
tiation influences the parties to desist from violence.
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out expressing any judgment on the results reached in these
instances, it may be stated that radical changes are not im-
possible of achievement by diplomacy. But the difficulty
arises when a group has to be persuaded or coerced to surren-
der the resources (territory and others) in its possession in
accordance with the solutions reached by diplomacy.
It is to be remembered that diplomacy is a communica-
tion process, and communication by itself, or the consensus
reached as an outcome thereof, cannot bring about a transfer-
ence of resources except by the consent of those that are
presently in control. In the last century, where such con-
sent was not forthcoming, recourse to violence was taken for
granted. The world community has moved far away from that
anarchical position, but it has yet to find more effective
alternatives to violence than diplomacy. The formulation of
goals which can form viable alternatives, and transitional
devices to reach such long-term goals, can be achieved only
by diplomacy.
The possibility of using diplomacy as an auxiliary in-
strument, concentrating primacy on the other more coercive
instruments, has been noticed. The seeming successes of
diplomacy in such situations should not mislead anyone into
overlooking the factors that have brought about the agree-
ment. Agreement is a legitimizing factor in social and legal
systems but only within certain prescribed limits. The pos-
sibility of some effects being unacceptable to the community
or its decision-makers, even though they are brought about by
agreement is always to be visualized. The issue that arises
in those contexts is whether the agreement is compatible with
the basic or fundamental values or expectations of the com-
munity. Perhaps some would debate the very existence of such
values or expectations.
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